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Abstract
Harnessing the heterogeneous datasets would improve system observability. While
the current metering infrastructure in distribution network has been utilized for the
operational purpose to tackle abnormal events, such as weather-related disturbance,
the new normal we face today can be at a greater magnitude. Strengthening the
interdependencies as well as incorporating new crowdsourced information can enhance
operational aspects such as system reconfigurability under extreme conditions. Such
resilience is crucial to the recovery of any catastrophic events. In this dissertation,
it is focused on the anomaly of potential foul play within an electrical distribution
system, both primary and secondary networks as well as its potential to relate to
other feeders from other utilities. The distributed generation has been part of the
smart grid mission, the addition can be prone to electronic manipulation.
This dissertation provides a comprehensive establishment in the emerging platform
where the computing resources have been ubiquitous in the electrical distribution
network. The topics covered in this thesis is wide-ranging where the anomaly infer-
ence includes load modeling and profile enhancement from other sources to infer of
topological changes in the primary distribution network. While metering infrastruc-
ture has been the technological deployment to enable remote-controlled capability
on the disconnectors, this scholarly contribution represents the critical knowledge
xxiii
of new paradigm to address security-related issues, such as, irregularity (tampering
by individuals) as well as potential malware (a large-scale form) that can massively
manipulate the existing network control variables, resulting into large impact to the
power grid.
xxiv
Chapter 1
Introduction
The existing distribution power system has been restricted to meet all of the de-
velopment requirements because of the commodification of electric power, the cor-
responding adjustment of energy policy, the improvement of electricity utilization
requirement, and the increase of renewable energy sources. Therefore, the hypothesis
of the smart grid as the future distribution power system was put forward. Through
the rapid expansion of smart grid in various countries, people received higher service
quality for many aspects which include electricity generation, power transmission,
distribution, and utilization.
Fig. 1.1 demonstrates the contrast of the current structure and the future structure
of the electrical distribution grid in the graph representation. The nodes connected
1
Figure 1.1: Contrast of the current structure and the future structure of
electrical distribution grid in graph representation.
to distribution transformers in the secondary network are denoted as consumers (res-
idential, commercial, and industrial). Only a few consumers are equipped with the
2
distributed generators, which include massive centralized plants, wind/water gener-
ators, small solar panels, and the growing roster of distributed energy resources as
well, as the renewable energy sources and/or backup generators. The distributed
generator from a renewable energy source should be operated connected through a
power electronic based voltage converter, commonly in one stage that converts DC to
AC. The DC to AC converter is called inverter and these distributed generators are
as “inverter-interfaced” [1, 2]. The distributed generator can result in electricity flows
in both directions through the inverter: from the distribution network to customers,
and from customers with distributed generator back into the distribution network.
For power quality enhancement service, the grid-connected inverter of an inverter-
interfaced unit has the similar structure as that of an active power filter. In general,
due to the intermittency of solar irradiation or wind speed, the inverter cannot fully
utilize its capacity and the idle capacity can be used to provide ancillary services [3,
4, 5, 6]. For inertia emulation service, the inverter-oriented distributed generators can
mimic the performances of a synchronous generator for inertia emulation and power
oscillation damping [5, 7, 8]. With more power from the inverter-interfaced units, the
absolute reserve power from synchronous generators and the grid inertia constant are
smaller due to the lower rated power of the rotating synchronous generators. As a
result, the frequency response shows faster behavior with higher maximum frequency
deviations when more distributed generation units are employed. The controllers
designed to regulate the performance of the distributed generation units participate
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also in improving the voltage stability in the system [1, 2].
The power supply in the distribution system is no longer a single “waterfall” mode,
with electricity flowing from the substation in one direction towards customers. Cur-
rent power system aspires to enable renewables penetration at a higher level by de-
veloping transformational grid control methods that optimize the use of flexible load
and distributed energy resources. The renewable energy generated from distributed
generators may be used onsite, or some or all of it may be exported to the distribution
network. In addition, the traditional power stations in a power system could be a
mix of energy sources, including renewable and conventional sources in the future.
The data flow direction is always from the users’ end side to the feeder head. In
current stage, despite installations of smart meters and supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) related recording devices, such as the remote terminal unit
(RTU), and feeder remote terminal unit (FRTU), are increasing rapidly, the measur-
able area does not reach the ideal status that each load and bus should be installed
with a real-time metering device to constantly observe the electric information. In
the future stage, more sensors and more controllable devices should be deployed in
the distribution system.
The diagram also shows the possibilities connect this network to the neighborhood
primary distribution network in case of any fault occurrence around the system. The
possibility of reconfiguring the topology should follow the rules that minimize the
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power losses and customer interruptions. To estimate the power losses in operations,
the power flow analysis is adopted. Since the distribution topology is radial, itera-
tive techniques commonly utilized in the transmission network power-flow analysis,
such as the conventional Gauss-Seidel (GS) and Newton Raphson (NR) method, are
not converge for the distribution network. A ladder technique which consists of two
parts: forward sweep and backward sweep, was the first solver examined to model
three-phase unbalanced distribution systems. As shown in Fig. 1.2, all series ele-
ments in a distribution line segment, which include the overhead/underground lines,
transformers, and regulators, can be represented as the aggregated component. With
reference to Fig. 1.2, the fundamental equations for a ladder solver, i.e., Forward-
Backwards sweeping (FBS) methods, are given by Eqs. 1.1 and 1.2, where [A], [B],[c],
and [d] are generalized line matrices. The FBS methods require multiple iterations
to converge even with linear or nonlinear load models. Under similar complexities,
the number of iterations in a nonlinear load model will be clearly increased than in a
linear model [9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
Figure 1.2: Standard feeder series component model.
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[Vabc]m = [A] · [Vabc]n − [B] · [Iabc]m (1.1)
[Iabc]n = [c] · [Vabc]m − [d] · [Iabc]m (1.2)
Even though there are insufficient smart recording devices to record each load’s con-
sumption, the load modeling of each load can be estimated according to the existing
SCADA system and historical consumption weighting factors. For example, Fig.
1.3 demonstrates a sample distribution feeder with the SCADA system. The RTU
connected with the feeder head is monitoring the whole feeder includes FRTU1 and
FRTU2. Since the tie switches connected to the microgrid are open, this RTU can-
not monitor the operation status in the microgrid, but another RTU connected with
the neighborhood primary network substation is capable of recording the usage in-
formation in this area. The metering summation of FRTU1 and FRTU2 should be
lower than the recording in RTU because of consumptions of other nodes following
the feeder and the power losses. Since the recording frequency of RTU/FRTU is
every 3 to 5 seconds while the smart meter is every 15 minutes, the consumption
curves from the FRTU and the summation of smart meters are with different time
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representations. The recording summation of smart meters in this branch is lower
than FRTU1 is also due to the power losses and metering errors. For the load area
connected with FRTU2, only one load equipped with a smart meter, approximate
methods have been used to gauge the weighting factors of individual loads which
can be studied from a survey or to estimate using allocation factors (AF) based on
transformer ratings associated with a root node of the metering point. As shown in
Eq.(1.3),
AF =
kW/kV ADemand
kV ATotal
(1.3)
the AF can be determined based on the three-phase kW or kVA demand and the
total connected distribution transformer kVA. The kV ATotal represents the sum of
the kVA rating of the distribution transformers [14].
The home area network (HAN) is the basic communication infrastructure in the con-
sumer side [15, 16]. It refers to the network that measure, collect and analyze con-
sumption information from advanced smart meters through various communication
media, for the purpose of forwarding the data to the grid data center and achieving
home monitoring. In each household, the home monitoring system, smart data col-
lector, and smart appliances can be interconnected through HAN. The neighborhood
7
Figure 1.3: Distribution Feeder with SCADA system and corresponding
consumption results.
area network (NAN) is the HAN complementary network that completes the distri-
bution subpart of the smart grid. A NAN connects multiple HANs collectively for the
purpose of accumulating consumption information from households (the HANs) in the
neighborhood and delivering the data to the utility company eventually. Therefore,
a precise and secure communication architecture and technology of the distribution
grid are critical for the future system.
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1.1 Grid Implementation Challenges
Once the future distribution grid has been deployed, it will incorporate numerous
advanced technologies, such as real-time data exchange, data mining, and modeling,
stable long-distance communication, cybersecurity, etc., to deal issues prevailing with
conventional electric systems. The direct benefits of the future distribution system
can be summarized as [17, 18, 19, 20]:
† The grid will be capable of accommodating wide various kinds of distributed
generators safely and seamlessly as mentioned before.
† Consumers can monitor and manage the “smart” devices, choose the working
and service time, avoid the power usage peak time, and pay bills according to
the dynamic price.
† The grid is capable of providing different grades of service with varying power
quality according to various pricing options and requirements.
† The disturbances and “faults” in the future distribution system can be detected,
localized and prevented rather than simply react to them, and may act faster
than operators ever could in resolving some emergency problems via the suffi-
cient metering points.
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† The protection devices and emergency measures in the future grid will address
critical security issues from the natural hazards and also can provide a more
safe and stable cyber environment.
However, the future distribution grid is still facing challenges in deployment [17, 18,
19, 20].
1.1.1 Inadequacies in Grid Infrastructure
Although the average advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) coverage in the US
power utilities has risen, the rate of deploying AMI devices remains at a slow pace,
modeling individual load consumption accurately within a distribution feeder has
been challenging due to the limited metering points in the networks. The existing
grid network is inadequate to accommodate the upcoming needs and requirements
of real-time monitoring for all loads, transmission and detection of clean energy, and
utilization of distributed generation, which may throw several challenges in design,
erection, operation, and maintenance. Therefore, an alternative method utilizes a sta-
tistical approach to correlate estimated occupancy datasets associated with the power
consumption can be developed to enhance the observability of a partially observable
distribution feeder. This method is described in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
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1.1.2 Data Management
In the future, a complete power grid consists of an enormous quantum “smart” de-
vices, such as smart meters, sensors, smart controllers, etc. The data from these
devices and from other external sources like occupancy information, weather condi-
tions, security alarms, etc. can help operators to enhance the safety and security of
the system. An accurate analysis of archived data could help operators to avoid a
breakdown or damage before the occurrence, improve the system operation, manage
alarms, forecast demand, and price, etc. The data so collected is really big in volume.
Voluminous data from these devices is not only difficult for collection and storage
but also poses critical challenges in retrieval and handling. Database management is
a vital issue in the distribution management system. The high volume of data may
slow down the process of data collection, analysis and report generation.
1.1.3 Communication Issues
Even though there are numerous communication technologies have been deployed
in the current power grid, the limited bandwidth, the limited exchange distance,
the higher data loss, cyber attacks, etc. are still main issues in distribution system
communication. There lacks a foolproof solution. Communication protocols do not
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have a unique standard and are not well defined in the distribution grid network [21,
22]. The global system for mobile communication (GSM) and the general packet radio
service (GPRS) have a coverage range of up to 10 km but they lack in data rates [21,
22, 23]. 3G requires costlier spectrum, whereas ZigBee is limited by coverage range
of 30 to 50 meters only. Wired communication like power line communication (PLC)
overcomes the issues of wireless communication but face the problem of interferences
[22, 23]. The optical fiber is fast and secure but is a high price. Communication issues
will lead to cybersecurity issues.
1.1.4 Cyber Security
The intelligent grid has been envisioned as a next-generation framework to modernize
power grid and improve its efficiency and sustainability. Real-time monitoring has
become a critical part of distribution network operation that enhances the control and
automation capabilities as metering technologies evolve. The metering infrastructure
has further extended from feeder head of a substation throughout the entire feeder
loads. The AMI has become indispensable in a smart grid to support the real-time
and reliable information exchange. However, computerizing the metering system also
introduces numerous new vectors for malware and cyber attacks. Massive tampering
of electrical metering is a notorious problem in the electric power system, which causes
great economic losses and threatens the reliability of the power system. In smart grids,
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smart meters may potentially be attacked or tampered to cause certain non-technical
losses (NTLs) [24, 25]. It is challenging to identify malicious meters when there
are a large number of users. Finding efficient measurements for detecting falsified
consumption datasets and locating the tampered load have been active researchers
in recent years. A graph-theoretic strategy for massive tampering detection based
on profile comparison using reconfiguration switching schemes will be presented in
Chapters 6 and 7.
As mentioned, connecting a power grid to a cyber network may trigger numerous vul-
nerabilities and intrusions in communication and data exchange of the system. De-
tecting, recognizing, and eliminating those loopholes before any security even safety
threatens happens is essential. Three basic objectives of cybersecurity in future dis-
tribution grid are availability [26, 27], which refers to reliable and timely access to the
database and other relative information, integrity, which includes the protection from
an improper format, modification, and destruction of archived data, and confidential-
ity that refers to the security of data from unauthorized access. Cybersecurity is one
of the substantial issues for operation since any single loophole has a potential threat
to turn into the disaster for utilities and individuals involved with the grid. Since
the distribution grid has a multilayer structure, each layer demands specific security
concerns, requirements, and corresponding protections.
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1.1.5 Privacy
Inadequacy in the vigilance of huge data handling poses a risk of potential consumer
privacy. Safety and security of consumers information are of utmost concern. Breach
of privacy of consumers information may occur as a consequence of any cyber threat
or lack of proper policy as well. To maintain the faith of consumers, their privacy must
be kept intact through cybersecurity as well as tough regulations. Hence complete
assurance to maintain consumer’s trust is required for acceptance of the real-time
monitoring system in the future [28, 29, 30, 31].
1.2 “Abnormality” and “Anomaly”
1.2.1 Abnormality
The abnormality in the fundamental analysis of power system always refers to the
electrical fault, which is caused by equipment failures such as transformers and ro-
tating machines, human errors and environmental conditions. These abnormalities
cause interruption to electric flows, equipment damages and even cause death.
The causes of power system abnormalities include weather conditions, which contains
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lighting strikes, heavy rains, heavy winds, salt deposition on overhead lines and con-
ductors, snow and ice accumulation on transmission lines, etc. These environmen-
tal conditions interrupt the power supply and also damage electrical installations.
Equipment failure is another reason to generate abnormality. Various types of elec-
trical equipment like generators, motors, transformers, reactors, switching devices,
etc. causes short circuit faults due to malfunctioning, aging, insulation failure of ca-
bles and winding. These failures result in a high current to flow through the devices
or equipment which further damages it. Electrical abnormalities are also caused due
to unconscious human errors, such as selecting the improper rating of equipment or
devices, forgetting metallic or electrical conducting parts after servicing or mainte-
nance, switching the circuit while it is under servicing, etc. The abnormality might
cause the damage to the power system [32, 33, 34].
The abnormality (fault) analysis conducted by reliability engineers involves locating
faults, determining the cause, determining if protective equipment operated properly
[35], and identifying what can be done to prevent the fault from occurring in the
future. Under normal circumstances, a feeder monitoring system is installed to record
voltage and current on every substation and every distribution feeder. Whenever the
current or voltage exceeds a specified threshold value, the event is recorded along with
pre and post-fault data to assist in the analysis of the event [34, 36]. The monitoring
system consists of a mainframe server to archive data, a remote terminal unit (RTU)
located in each substation and a feeder remote terminal unit (FRTU) at each feeder
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to record the data.
A software package that allows the user to view waveforms associated with fault
events as well as graphs associated with periodic data also installed in the system.
Several automated reports are available in the software to view event data in various
formats as well as provide diagnostic data on the health of the RTU and FRTU. The
software also provides information on the operation of the substation capacitor banks
which is very helpful in analyzing customer power quality problems.
In the power quality, abnormalities can include low power factor, voltage variations,
frequency variations, and surges. When the power delivered to a system does not
match what is expected, equipment can malfunction, prematurely fail, or not work
at all.
1.2.2 Anomaly
Different than abnormality, the concept of the anomaly was promoted following the
development of the smart grid. The operational and control center is the critical
infrastructure of the electric power system. The restructuring of the power indus-
try has transformed its operation from a centralized model to a coordinated decen-
tralized decision-making model. In order to achieve the new model, the electricity
management network, the corporate network, and the use of information technology
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produce vulnerabilities and expose the electricity cyberinfrastructure to securities
threats [37, 38].
Through the development of AMI, the supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) and energy management systems (EMS) as a part of modern power control
system, play a vital role to monitor and detect the safety, reliability, and protective
functions of the power grid. However, these systems, that were designed to maximize
functionality with little attention paid to security, represent the potential vulnerabil-
ity to service disruption or operational data manipulation that could result in public
safety concerns. The anomaly in data and network layer of the modern power system
refers to the unusual measurements with highly differing from old observed patterns
that caused by network attacks, malicious tampering, viruses. It might not damage
the power system. The anomaly frequently occurred through conscious sabotage from
attackers and the main motivation is related to economic expenses.
17
1.3 Issues Associated with Anomalies
1.3.1 Malware
As the crucial part of the modern power grid, SCADA has a complex large-scale ar-
chitecture, operate with real-time data exchange, and connect to the IP-based com-
munication network. Therefore, keep secure and immune to malware attacks from
SCADA during the normal operating is a massive challenge.
Malware attacks have evolved from the common internet worm and virus attacks to
more precise attacks on target systems. While there have been significant damages
by these internet worms and virus attacks, the present set of malware are designed to
specifically steal information which is considered confidential, take control of systems
for malicious purposes, create pathways (backdoors) through which other attacks can
be launched or cause a complete breakdown of targeted infrastructures [39, 40, 41]. A
typical example of such malware is Stuxnet [42]. Malware attacks on SCADA systems
vary from mere invasive forms (e.g. to steal confidential information or to analyze the
traffic of power supply by the system) to more invasive forms (e.g. to take control of
the system or to cause a disruption in the normal functions of the systems) [43].
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1.3.2 Fraudulent/Malicious Consumer
The fraudulent/malicious consumers is always a notorious problem in electric power
systems over time and have serious implications for both utility companies and legit-
imate users. The fraudulent users tempering utility meters to disorganize or signif-
icantly reduce their billing information. In some situations, they have more energy
used by rogue connections than the actual consumption, such as steal energy by con-
necting an extra cable to the power line without any energy meters. The fraudulent
actions can be in the form of theft (meter tempering), stealing (illegal connections),
billing irregularities and unpaid bills [44, 45].
The U.S., it is estimated that utility companies lose billions of dollars in revenue every
year, while in developing countries, energy losses caused by malicious consumers can
amount to 50% of the total energy delivered [46]. Energy fraud also leads to excessive
energy consumption which may cause equipment malfunction or damage [47], and
often enables criminal activities, such as the illegal production of substances.
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1.4 Heterogeneous Data Sources in Distribution
System
Average coverage of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) in US power utilities has
risen to 40.6 percent as of 2014 [48, 49]. Increasing the number of metering points
improves load observability. A higher rate of AMI deployment occurred between 2010
and 2011 due to the Recovery Act Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) program
[50] in addition to increased utility investments. However, there is not sufficient data
for the observability of the entire system, modeling each load consumption accurately
within a distribution feeder has been challenging due to the limited metering points
in the networks. For load model structure development, more load characteristics
considered, a more flexible and sophisticated model can be constructed. Considering
the possibilities of heterogeneous data sources that can be utilized and adopted in
the distribution system will help operators and utilities to monitor and manage the
grid well.
The application of heterogeneous data technology in the distribution network covers
the entire procedure of data processing: from data acquisition and transmission to
data identification, from data mining and processing to intelligent decision making,
and finally to technology application and promotion.
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1.4.1 Data Gathering Approaches
The current distribution system has sparse data collection points, narrow data trans-
mission channels, and weak data processing capabilities. It is hard for managers to
obtain valuable information and do efficient analysis through limited data sources.
With the improvement of advanced power technologies, the distribution network data
monitoring, acquisition, transmission, and management systems have been developed
to provide a wealth of heterogeneous multi-source databases for distribution network
operation and management.
Specifically, as shown in Fig. 1.4, the basic consumption information of the distri-
bution grid as the fundamental information for the system operating and monitoring
can be gathered from SCADA, the distribution management system (DMS), and
the energy management system (EMS). The geographic information system (GIS)
can provide the dynamic network topology and the geographic information while the
operation status can be inferred and monitored according to the data generated in
SCADA, DMS, and the distribution automation (DA) system.
Since the eventual task of the distribution system is to serve the social economy,
economic development information of the society includes the investment in grid
implementation is also one of the heterogeneous data sources that may directly affect
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Figure 1.4: Flowchart of the application of heterogeneous data sources.
the development of the distribution network. This data source can be acquired from
the municipal system.
Customers as the essential part of the power service, their load types, power quality
satisfaction, power supply requirements, and complaints could also affect the oper-
ation and management of the whole system. Therefore, the customers’ information
can be treated with another heterogeneous data source gathered from the trouble call
management (TCM) system [51, 52, 53].
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The weather and environment data, including the temperature, humidity, carbon
dioxide emissions, etc., could significantly impact power consumptions. Researchers
have paid lots of attention on correlating the interrelationship between these two
[54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60]. The extreme weather such as the hurricane, tsunami,
tornado, and lightning could threaten the safety of the distribution system. Operators
could adjust the system operation accordingly based on the weather and environment
data collected from the GIS and meteorological system.
Because load consumption is closely related to human behaviors, different load mod-
els may be found in different time periods correlate with occupants movements and
relative electricity activities. Even though the effects of occupancy are sometimes not
noticeable. There are numerous examples such as large industrial facilities or agricul-
tural facilities and automation that can be insensitive to the existence of occupants
at the site, e.g., server farms, refineries and chemical plants, cold-storage facilities,
irrigation pumps. In addition, in commercial and residential buildings, load error
may often be closely related to weather. However, occupancy correlation is funda-
mentally related to power consumption. For example, customers adjust the settings
of heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) system when they would be at
home. As the most important section in heterogeneous data sources, occupancy data
can be obtained from the human movement sensors, statistical survey methods, and
the tracking of mobile devices. The detailed application and correlation between
occupancy and power consumption will be illustrated in the following chapters.
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1.4.2 Application of Heterogeneous Data
Fig. 1.4 demonstrates the flowchart of the application of heterogeneous data. Al-
though heterogeneous data provides a variety of data sources to improve and enhance
monitoring, operation, and management of distribution systems, not all of the input
data can be directly applied for data analysis and modeling. Before the decision-
making module, the data identification and analysis model is necessary. Different
types of data must be systematically and effectively classified first. In the process of
data collection, part of the data may come from manual reading and entry, such as
statistical survey methods and TCM records. Manual input of large amounts of data
is very likely to produce errors. Validation of data integrity, accuracy, and validity is
the priority for data modeling and related analysis. The detected “bad” data should
be eliminated. Commonly used identification and validation methods include extreme
value theory [61, 62], residual correction method [63, 64], and pseudo-measurement
detection method [65]. A detailed data validation process is presented in Chapters 4
and 5. Some new theories and techniques such as neural network methods, machine
learning, and heuristic algorithms, which is applied in Chapters 4 and 5, are also
utilized in data analysis.
Through the analysis of the characteristics of the customers’ electricity usage behav-
iors, variations in the occupancy of a lumped load area, climate and environmental
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impacts, dynamic changes in the power grid structures and other heterogeneous in-
formation, an adaptive power-consumption prediction/estimation model with higher
accuracy could be established. This is also conducive to the realization of the power
sources, including distributed generators (DG), and loads coordinated scheduling.
The timely maintenance, power outage management, and restoration process accord-
ing to the accurate detection of the potential fault in system operation could reduce
power losses and improve users’ service. Take remedial and penalties once a tampering
behavior is detected. Eventually, the multi-sources heterogeneous data could help the
distribution system to achieve the intelligence management in optimal investments
planning, stable and safe operation, reasonable erection and implementation, timely
and effective maintenance, etc.
1.5 Contributions
The main contribution of this thesis is to perform anomaly inference according to the
existing database and heterogeneous data sources in an electrical distribution net-
work. First, sensitivity analyses of occupancy and how it influences load consump-
tions under real conditions is performed. An agent-based model is then proposed to
characterize occupant movement and electrical loads by generating datasets for this
study. A statistical distribution with a heuristic regression model is then applied
to correlate these two distinct properties to generate a time-dependent model. The
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dynamic profiles of human movement and its load characteristics are established with
parametric adjustments.
In addition, two real datasets, in terms of occupancy and power consumption (OP),
are estimated according to a real case. Then, the sensitivity and correlation analysis
are performed based on the regression method. Since model deviations from the a
priori estimate of the regular pattern as a time-varying process with the curve fitting,
the possible structural deviations in real-time demand are then considered to update
the a priori regression model using new real-time estimates and observations obtained
every demanded time duration.
The proposed correlation work offers an alternative to improve system observability
of a distribution network with other interdependent networks. The applications of
the proposed methods are to build a representative load profile that can be adapted
to other unmetered load points, which could have tremendous value to having less
frequent on-site data collections in a specific area of distribution network coverage as
a result of labor savings.
As a distribution feeder has mixtures of load types that require specific treatment of
load modeling. The extension of a load type to many, such as industrial, commercial,
and residential, can be enhanced by relating to thousands of metered and unmetered
loads within a feeder. Such a correlation with human movement would strengthen
the load modeling. The crowdsourced information on an individual position from
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the Internet about the real-time human movement in an area can be integrated for
future work. Though, this enhancement might be limited to the availability of cellular
devices an individual may have and carry with them.
With the trustable data source, the potential fraudulent load or clusters with ma-
licious meters can be localized by combining the profile-based tampering detection
method with switching operations of topology reconfiguration. A turnable thresh-
old of anomaly will be applied to find the best balance between true and false alarm
rates. The line section being detected does not need to be isolated. A graph-theoretic
strategy for tampering detection based on profile comparison using reconfiguration
switching schemes is presented. An intelligence searching algorithm is performed to
reduce the searching time and iterations.
In the modern power system, the SCADA and the AMI network may potentially be
attacked or tampered to cause the certain anomalous discrepancy. It is challenging
to identify malicious devices or meters when there are a large number of users. The
credibility of the measurements from the instruments will affect the safety and stabil-
ity of the entire system. The alert system in meters will provide information support
to operators or users according to different types of attacks or threats. However,
some alarms will still affect the normal operation of the instruments, resulting in
data losses, tampering, or trustworthiness. A massive tampering inference scheme
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based on the variation of measurements from FRTUs and smart meters SMs is pro-
posed. A probabilistic trust model based on alarm statistics to estimate possible or
detectable data losses or tampering is also presented. Once the anomalous discrep-
ancy exceeds the range of readings predicted by the trust model, an undetectable
massive tampering could be inferred in the system.
1.6 Thesis Outline
Figure 1.5: Overview of connection between Chapters in this dissertation.
Fig. 1.5 illustrates the overview of the connection between Chapters in this dis-
sertation. Chapter 2 discusses the emergency operations in the distribution system
according to graph modeling. The graph representation and model in this chapter
is the essential part for anomaly detection and inference in Chapters 6, 7, and 8. In
Chapter 3, a hybrid regression analysis is proposed to correlate the estimation of me-
tered load profile with building occupancy in a distribution system that is conducted
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based on actual datasets. Five possible regression candidates of load fitting func-
tions for modeling the relationship between occupancy and energy consumption. The
property regression models for load model in the distribution system are adjusted by
correlating with data available from AMI, on-site reading, derivation of billing kWh
information, or SCADA analog and digital measurements.
Since one distribution feeder has a variety of load types that require specific treatment
of load modeling. By relating with thousands of metered and unmetered loads within
a feeder, the extension of one load type to many, such as industrial, commercial, and
residential, can be promoted. Human activities will also enhance the load modeling.
The crowdsourced data about individual locations from the Internet that covers real-
time human movement is integrated into Chapters 4 and 5.
In Chapter 4, a heuristic regression model is proposed to correlate the estimation of
load profile with the number of occupants in a distribution system that is conducted
based on an agent-based model. The adaptive parameterization of consumption ag-
gregation from the number of customers as well as the determination of regression
models from load profiles has demonstrated a promise in the proposed correlation
framework. The proposed finite mixtures of regression models for load model in the
distribution system are adjusted by correlating with data available from metering
and/or survey recording results. The estimated occupancy can be gathered and syn-
thesized from cellular devices around an area. Other technologies may be possible
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but are not general enough to harness data in large scale.
In Chapter 5, a heterogeneous framework is utilized to enhance load models that
incorporate the dynamics of occupants movements and how the existence patterns
may influence the energy consumption. As each load may have a unique pattern
that can be inferred from its activities, the proposed OP paired points can set as a
statistical reference for inferring the consumption usages. The load profile enrichment
can be established through the infusion of the historical energy consumption datasets.
The proposed regression framework represents the observable dynamics of consumers
energy consumption and movements which are used to correlate the patterns of two
interdependencies. The adaptive parameterization of the occupancy-consumption
aggregation has demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed correlation framework.
In Chapter 6, with improved system observability and sufficient data sources, an
anomaly detection and localization technique using switching procedures based on
the graph theory is proposed. The profile-based anomaly detection method is utilized
to compare the consumption value displayed on the feeder head with the summation
of all meters readings in its downstream. After localizing the anomaly load node, the
comparison of consumption pattern for all meters connected with this node will be
performed to find the tampered customer. In the process of localizing the anomaly
load node, the distribution network is converted to a spanning tree to demonstrate
the connection states in the topology and to avoid generating loops during switching
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procedures, and then convert the spanning tree to incidence or adjacency matrix for
future analysis. An anomaly localization algorithm is introduced to find the tampered
load node. In addition, the cost consideration is mentioned to balance the benefit of
localizing the anomaly point(s) within a large distribution topology.
In Chapter 7, a new approach to tampered node localization in full AMI using the
concept of the graph theory is presented. The data-based tampering detection method
is utilized to help indicate the existing of attacks or tampering activities in the system.
An intelligence searching algorithm is performed to reduce the searching time and
iterations. The consideration of subfeeders, clusters, or microgrids with distributed
generators will reduce the number of combinations during the switching procedures
that can accelerate the localization of the spot with the anomaly. In the process of
localizing the tampered load node, the distribution network is converted to a graph
only contains vertices and edges. The graph is demonstrated as incidence or adjacency
matrix for the analysis. A tampered node localization algorithm within a distribution
system is introduced.
Chapter 8 proposes a massive tampering inference scheme based on the variation of
measurements from FRTUs and smart meters. A probabilistic trust model based on
alarm statistics to estimate possible or detectable data losses or tampering is also pre-
sented. Once the anomalous discrepancy exceeds the range of readings predicted by
the trust model, an undetectable massive tampering could be inferred in the system.
31
Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the thesis work, discusses limitations, and outlines
future research directions.
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Chapter 2
Graph-Based Distribution
Emergency Operation
2.1 Introduction
Emergency situations in the electrical distribution network are various and frequent,
especially in system operation and management [66, 67]. The computerized man-
agement system for distribution operation plays a vital role in the emerging elastic
framework in topological reconfiguration [68, 69, 70]. Electrical fault currents often
cause protective relays to react to disturbances, resulting in large-scale power outages
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that can affect thousands of customers. Locating fault segments or damaged com-
ponents in a feeder between all border switches can be very time-consuming. The
exchange of information between all entities, which include the existing indicators
(such as fault indicators), trouble call tickets from customers, and field crew reports,
can help to efficiently search for fault locations. By implementing a remote-controlled
device on the distribution feeder, the search time can be reduced and achieve the tem-
porary restore power to all customers in the “health” area by changing tie switches
status. Eventually, the fault will be removed and restore power to all customers
promptly. This can significantly improve overall system reliability in an emergency.
Due to the radial topology and unbalanced nature of the electrical distribution sys-
tem, the topology can be represented by an incident and/or adjacency matrix (will be
described in following chapters), where topological state and connectivity of intercon-
nected feeders are critical to the application of the control center. The architecture
of distributed SCADA/DMS is built on customer interaction management modeling,
where the topology is significant for the structure used by the application. Topol-
ogy is required in the management and operation of the power distribution system
because dynamic geographic maps need to display [71] in the SCADA system and
be utilized for operation analysis. These continuous updates are designed by dis-
tribution planning engineers to record the latest configuration of topology updates,
including adding/removing/transmitting distribution transformers, new line segments
or switches in the network. As the most common graphical representation platform,
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GIS is often used to demonstrate incremental updates of topology information to en-
sure that the integrity and accuracy of these databases are up-to-date. These datasets
describe all chart objects based on the data types, the measured value, and how it
should be displayed on the map as well as symbols or drawing primitives. The static
data and object data must be linked to the same SCADA device or metering element
associated with the distribution node data, which is dynamically reflected by the
system stimulus state.
Designing an unbalanced power flow module according to dynamic topology is crit-
ical in distribution engineering. Real-time evaluation using power flow modules will
provide near real-world scenario simulations to predict the best results available for
operational purposes. Computational or analytical methods should be developed to
perform stringent operational type analysis, estimate system power loss, and meet
the requirements of hypothetical analysis of large distribution systems connecting
multiple substations. This is because the program will play an important role in de-
termining unknown variables, such as the voltage and currents of all nodes, including
all load nodes and distribution nodes (without loads), as well as the reactive power
and angle of the generators (power injection nodes). This solution ensures a complete
balance of the feeder when the power flow calculation converges. This is a very use-
ful solution for determining the total active and reactive losses that can simulate a
hypothetical scenario at a given time, and the solution with operational constraints
[72, 73]. Different solutions provide multiple proposals to dispatchers in the system
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control center to decide which tie switch they must turn on and off to temporarily
restore the service to the ”healthy” part of the area.
The main tasks of emergency operation in the distribution system is to assist the
operator under faulted conditions and emergency operation to identify the fault type:
permanent or temporary, find out the fault location based on fault indicators or
trouble call tickets, perform fault isolation through changing the status of border tie
switches, and achieving system or partial system recovery according to switching pro-
cedures (for RCSs) and/or field crew coordination (for non-RCSs). System operators
and managers need to have a good understanding of the topology of the controlled
network area in order to perform these tasks efficiently. However, topologies typi-
cally contain many components and various connection options. It is difficult to find
the exact fault location accurately and quickly with limited information. Without
the help of system automation, operators and managers must work with the training
simulator to use these features proficiently and effectively.
2.2 Graph-Based Power Flow
The power distribution system is a low voltage system that maintains a radial topology
or a temporary weak mesh network with a wide range of reactance and resistance
values. The distribution system can include a large number of clusters or parts, such
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as a microgrid. Due to the three-phase load imbalance and the presence of single-phase
and/or two-phase loads in the lumped load region, there may be unbalanced loads in
the distributed portion of the system. Phase frame approximation forward-backward
sweep method has been proposed for power flow analysis in radial topologies and
weak mesh networks. Fig. 2.1 demonstrate the process of the proposed graph-based
power flow analysis. The up-to-date topology of a distribution system network can
be constructed in GIS platform. A reduction model will be then applied to simplify
the topology and delete the redundant nodes. The GIS data extraction process can
obtain the geographical data from shapefile and generate the corresponding adjacency
and/or incidence matrix to show the connection between nodes directly. Then, a
data structure is constructed to illustrate corresponding data types, connections,
quantifications, etc. for different components in the system. The detailed description
of the data structure is described in the following section. Since the power flow
approach is selected as the backward-forward sweep, the related “a”, “b”, “c”, “d”,
“A”, and “B” matrices can be generated from the data structure. Combining with
the latest topology and the required data for each component, the backward-forward
sweep can be performed to estimate the voltage and current for each node.
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Figure 2.1: Flow chart of the graph based power flow analysis.
2.2.1 Geospatial and Topological Data Establishment
Extracting data from GIS is the process of retrieving demand data from the original
shapefile and transforming the information into the required data form for further
analysis and processing. Extracting geographic data from GIS is based on data at-
tribute values, spatial extents, and geographic features. Using the extraction tool
in GIS, the spatial reference can be used to extract the attribute information of the
selected layer in the specified area to the desired format. New attributes or subsets
of features can be generated for analysis.
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Since the adjacency and incidence matrix can display the straightforward interrela-
tionship between vertices and edges, the matrix is employed to store and demonstrate
the current connection state of the network topology. A distribution feeder typically
consists of hundreds of electrical elements in the network. The following enumerates
the essentials of typical distribution components in a feeder [14]. Furthermore, this
process converts the topology to the mathematic model which is machine recogniz-
able. The further relevant algorithm and analysis can be performed based on the
matrix[74].
1. Line segments (edges)
2. Distribution transformers (edges)
3. Switches (edges)
4. Voltage regulators (edges)
5. Loads (vertices)
6. Capacitors (vertices)
7. Distributed energy resources (vertices)
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2.2.2 Reduction Model
In graph transformation and topological analysis, the reduction model in graph theory
is used to simplify the work process and reduce repeated operations by eliminating
redundant processes [75, 76, 77]. These processes can be blocks or clusters in a
large-scale topology or can be vertices and edges in the graph. Similarly, power flow
applications are performed on an equivalent graphical representation of a distributed
network, which is typically very complex and involves a large number of edges and
vertices. Depending on economic considerations and real geographic conditions, there
may be multiple distribution nodes without any load in the deployment of actual
feeders. These nodes are considered redundant nodes and may cause double counting
during power flow analysis. The reduction function is used to eliminate redundant
nodes and generate a relatively explicit topology.
2.2.3 Define Data Structure
A realistic distribution system is complex and contains multiple components. Gen-
erally speaking, the elements in a distribution system consisting of load, capacitor,
regulator, overhead and/or underground lines, and transformers. The power injection
sources or substations should be defined before the power flow analysis. The data
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types and parameters for each component in a distribution system should be specified:
† Load.
– Connection Types: delta or wye.
– Parameters: kVA, power factor, constant power, constant current, and
constant impedance.
† Capacitor.
– Connection Types: delta or wye.
– Parameters: kVAr and kV.
† Regulator.
– Types: type A or type B.
– Connection Types: delta or wye.
– Parameter: tap.
† Branch: Overhead or Underground.
– Overhead Parameters: phase conductor, neutral conductor, Cartesian co-
ordinates of abcn.
– Underground: tape shield or concentric neutral.
– Tape Shield Parameters: cable data, thickness of tape shield, neutral data,
and phase conductor diameter.
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– Concentric Neutral Parameters: outside diameter, number of strands,
phase conductor, neutral conductor, radius of the circle passing through
the center of the strands, Cartesian coordinates of abcn.
† Transformers
– Types: delta grounded wye, ungrounded wye delta, open wye open delta,
ground wye wye, delta delta, and open delta delta.
– Parameters for Each Type of Transformers: kVLL high, kVLN low, kVA,
Z.
Since the forward-backward sweep approach is selected as the power flow method,
some conversions need to extract and combine all relative information to generate the
required matrix a, b, c, d, A, and B. The structure matrix is designed to display the
connection states and all of its eigenvalues to be equal to one to ensure its invertibility.
Then, the data structure with corresponding characteristics and parameters of each
node and edge are incorporating.
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2.2.4 Distribution Power Flow Analysis
In the operation and management of power distribution systems, power flow analysis
plays a vital role in automation, including fault isolation proposals, switch combina-
tions and service recovery in network reconfiguration. A large-scale distribution sys-
tem has a complex topology and often update the connection status of tie switches,
including load balancing and emergency operations. Therefore, the dynamic data
structure allows dynamic topology reconfiguration, isolation, and restoration in the
event of a failure, which is necessary for power flow analysis. Automation in modern
power systems can handle these complex operations that require frequent topology
changes (topology reconfiguration) in the power distribution system, which requires
a dynamic topology logger based on a well-defined data structures[78, 79].
The forward-backward sweep approach is based on the ladder network theory. In
the backward sweep, this approach calculates the distribution system bus voltages
and adds the currents for each section. In the forward sweep, this method corrects
the substation voltage on the feeder head with the initialized voltage value, the bus
voltages in the system are calculated again in this iteration. No topological recon-
figuration allowed during this backward and forward process and the approach meet
the requirements of circuit laws. The convergence process will consist of multiple
iterations and all bus voltages are computed twice in each iteration. After the first
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forward and backward sweeps, the updated load voltages are calculated based on the
most recent currents. The forward-backward sweep continues until the mismatch of
the load voltages results between the new and the previous iteration is within the
predefined tolerance.
2.3 Emergency Operation
The outage management system is one of the main components of the DMS, which is
triggered by the occurrence of the fault(s). The existing fault localization technology
is mainly realized by the fault indicator and the trouble call tickets form customers.
A fault indicator is used to assist the management and control system to locate
faulty components on the electrical distribution system. It usually equipped with a
remote-controllable switch. In the fault localization analysis, the fault indicator only
considered “Yes” or “No”. Through the application of fault indicators, the search
time required for locating faults can be significantly reduced. The goal of the fault
segment location is to minimize the interruption of power delivery and promote power
recovery in a timely manner, which will increase the reliability of the entire system.
A fault indicator in the automation of the SCADA network provides clues that the
fault location may fall within a certain area. This will help the field crew in the area
to narrow down the faulted area by controlling the non-remote-controlled switches
and determine the exact location eventually. The unaffected customers could recover
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service by temporarily connecting the NO switch from another feeder.
The goal of fault isolation is to separate the faulted area, segment, or component
of the network from the fault-free part. Isolation should ensure that the number
of fault-free devices connected to the fault segment is minimized. In the graphical
representation of the power distribution network, after the fault zone is located, the
boundary remote-controlled switch connected to the zone is opened to isolate the
faulty segment from the faultless zone.
The remote-controlled switches with fault indicators can localize and isolate an area
first, the field crew change the states of non-remote-controlled switches and coordinate
with the control center to narrow down the specific fault spot in the faulted area.
The crew management system should be able to handle large amounts of data and
complexities in multiple power outages. The system can receive and record outage
events information from field personnel. In addition, the database of the system
provides information about the spatial mapping of the power distribution system
and the feeder facilities, including topology information for the feeder configuration,
feeder facilities, and customer data. When the repair is complete, a historical event
database is created for the failure event. Eventually, the crew management system
will assist the dispatcher and operator by tracking the status of the incident, the
crew’s resources, and the effective assignment of field staff and tools to the incident.
The power supply for some customers will be temporarily restored in the faulted area
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promptly and the number of affected users will be reduced after the crew coordination
process. After removing the fault, the tie switches and configuration of the topology
should be back to the normal condition. The flow chart of emergency operations in
the electrical distribution system is demonstrated in Fig. 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Flow chart of emergency operations in distribution system.
Fig. 2.3 illustrates an example scenario of emergency operations in a distribution
system. A real power distribution system is much more complicated than this exam-
ple. This simple scenario includes two feeders and includes multiple remote-controlled
switches (equipped with fault indicators) and non-remote-controlled switches. Stage
0 demonstrates the normal condition of this system. The normally open (NO) switch
break these two feeders.
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Figure 2.3: An example scenario of emergency operations in a distribution
system.
Once a fault occurs in a feeder as shown in Stage 1, the fault indicator at feeder
head shows there exists a fault and open the remote-controlled switch automatically
to isolate the faulted segment. During this time, the operators in the control center
could receive trouble calls from customers in the isolated area (shown with red color).
In Stage 2, the breaker is tripped and the field crew will following the event logs,
reports, or experience and coordinate with the control center to search the damaged
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spot and narrow down the affected area. As shown in Stage 3, the NO switch is closed
that the service of customers in the gray area is restored temporarily. Following the
searching process, the affected area is reduced in Stage 4. Finally, the minimum
faulted area is localized and isolated. After fixing the fault, the system can be back
to the normal stage (from Stage 5 to Stage 0).
2.4 Emergency Operation Summary
With the development of SCADA system and the advanced metering infrastructure
(AMI), distribution systems can be accurately analyzed and modeled. The SCADA
metering device, FRTU and/or RTU is mainly the pole-mounted equipment in the
primary distribution network, while the smart meters are equipped on the customer
side in the secondary network. The customer billing center introduces a demand
response based on the measurement feedback of the metering device to adjust peak
and off-peak power usage and set dynamic pricing rules. Two-way communication
between meters and suppliers in smart meters encourages customers to adjust their
spending habits to better respond to dynamic electricity prices and manage their
further assert. Although the AMI coverage of US electric utilities has risen, the
deployment of real-time metering equipment is still slow, and because of the limited
metering points in the network, accurately simulating individual load consumption
within distribution feeders has been a challenge.
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The distribution management system (DMS) plays a crucial role in the electrical dis-
tribution system. Once a fault or any other emergency situation occurs, the automa-
tion system in DMS will coordinate the information gathered from metering devices
and/or indicators with the reports and experience of operators and field crew to deal
with this problem. The emergency operations consist of fault localization, isolation,
and system temporary restoration. After removing the fault, the system (including
the operation states and topology) should be back to the original state. Real-time
information exchange between the control center and the crew who are investigating
field failures can speed up search time and greatly improve system reliability.
The possibility of topology reconfiguration can be within a feeder, between feeders
associated with the same substation, or between feeders of adjacent substations. Each
incremental update will be imported into SCADA to reflect the real scene. GIS is
a versatile tool that helps planning engineers update outdated distributed network
topologies. The GIS dataset can be extracted and converted to an incident or adja-
cency matrix. The incident or adjacency matrix can provide a visual representation to
associate the connected elements in the distribution system. This will help us identify
from the matrix where the possible adjustments and likelihood counts are expected
to facilitate troubleshooting in the code. Although the actual situation is much more
complicated than the virtual hypothesis, a similar assessment based on other combi-
nations of distribution elements across the primary and secondary elements can be
evaluated in the same way.
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A resilient distribution system should not only be able to withstand failures but
also be successful in more extreme situations, such as natural disasters or intentional
violations by malicious consumers/organizations. Graphical modeling in the context
of motivational state and reconfigurability will be the link for their future research
and exploration.
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Chapter 3
Enhancement of Distribution Load
Modeling Using Statistical Hybrid
Regression
3.1 Introduction
Enhancement of system observability with real-time monitoring in distribution net-
works has been promoted in recent years. Although efforts have been made to increase
the number of new IP-based metering infrastructure with additional “smart” devices,
the issues to accurately validate and establish the statistical distribution of unmetered
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loads for a feeder has been at large dependent upon other already deployed IP-based
devices in distribution networks. The IP-based metering infrastructure has been grad-
ually improved over time by extending the single flow of information using automated
metering reading (AMR) to bi-directional information flow using advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI). Specifically, the applications based on the real-time metering
information include state estimation, load allocation, probabilistic load flow, volt-VAr
optimization (VVO), fault localization and system restoration for feeder reconfigu-
ration and optimality. Modeling individual load profile can provide an enhancement
of system observability to strengthen metering infrastructure and have a better un-
derstanding of the load behavior. The previous method requires metering individual
loads in an entire feeder separately to determine the load models, which may not
be practical in a short-term. Only the aggregated energy consumption information
and data from metered loads are able to observe for the entire feeder or substation
through smart meters deployed in the field.
For the energy consumption estimation of a building, the dependent variable is nor-
mally the electric utility usage, and the independent variables can include occupancy
levels, weather statistics (e.g., average temperatures during test period or heating
ventilation air conditioning (HVAC) condition), and utilization factors (e.g., area of
structure, working days, power consumption rate of different utility unit). A com-
prehensive understanding of the load behaviors and characteristics can impact on the
control and management to conserve energy. Predictably, the energy consumption of
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a building during workdays is typically higher than that on the weekends and national
or international events.
Most of the methods applied over the past years introduce statistical modeling based
on the survey data for specific load types in the distribution system. A flexible regres-
sion analysis applied in this paper on different load shapes to present the relationship
between occupancy and energy consumption. This analysis is a prioritization scheme
that can provide an efficient method to enhance load modeling accuracy, system relia-
bility, as well as distribution system state estimation (DSSE). Also, it can be applied
to main building types after proving the feasibility of this study. One uncertain fac-
tor of occupancy was proposed to estimate the electricity consumption as well as to
enhance load modeling.
3.2 Enhanced Load Modeling Framework
Regression analysis has been used for decades for dealing with the issues related to
energy saving and optimization. A suitable model with the best fitting coefficient
according to the trend and relativity of historical data can improve the accuracy of
the prediction and estimation. The methodology of the analysis and modeling is
presented in this section.
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Fig. 3.1 shows the flowchart of the organization of this paper to present the framework
for this work. Through the connection among all the blocks, the logic between each
section is demonstrated. In this work, statistical energy consumption data and the
number of customers in buildings are acquired as the response variables and donated
as the statistical occupancy respectively. Dataset verification and preprocessing mod-
ule justify the validity of input data. The statistical regression models are selected
to implement the proposed hybrid regression analysis. Once regression models meet
the requirements of validation, choose the best model to estimate the energy con-
sumption within the corresponding time frame. Otherwise, the proposed adjustment
of the dataset is applied to construct the combined regression model. The detailed
descriptions for each module are discussed below.
3.2.1 Data Availability
The following types of data are commonly useful to a distribution system for load
profiling purposes: (i) regular energy consumptions of individual customers, (ii) cus-
tomer types, i.e., residential, commercial and industrial, and (iii) representative load
profiles for each type of customers. For the collection of regular energy consumption
data, despite the ongoing rollout of electricity “smart” meters, there remains a large
portion of customers having no such capability deployed [50, 80, 81, 82]. One of the
challenges of load modeling is a lack of the observation of measurement records for
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Figure 3.1: Organizational flowchart of the proposed correlation frame-
work.
all customers.
For these customers, on-site readings of energy consumption are undertaken by crews
on a regular basis (daily, weekly, or monthly). Furthermore, according to the bills and
the price of electricity provided by the local power supplier or electricity utilities, the
energy consumption during different time duration can be calculated. In addition, an
image extraction method [83] can be utilized to obtain the real-time data from the
eligible building as well. Also important is real-time information from SCADA. This
feeder partition is useful in simplifying the regression analysis of system observability
enhancement with a zonal approach.
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The daily statistical survey result of occupancy for a specific load with a regular energy
usage schedule can be obtained based on the records of the employee or the attendance
of students. For the irregular loads, utilization of sensors and survey methods has
been employed to collect statistical datasets. In transportation engineering, the study
of human mobility can regularly infer traffic conditions from the cellular devices by
tracking their positions [84, 85, 86].
In addition to the existing methods, a novel stochastic agent-based model of occu-
pancy dynamics between loads with an arbitrary number of zones and occupants can
be established for estimating occupants’ movements. The maximum number of oc-
cupants in a building can be generated by the ratio of the available floor space to
the average of an individual occupied area in this building. The dynamic occupancy
of this building can be estimated according to the different attendance probabili-
ties based on different time frames of each occupant who is called the agent in this
model. Furthermore, the corresponding demand response (DR) of this building can
be determined by GridLAB-D, which is a multi-agent simulation engine including
advanced algorithms that can determine the simultaneous state of millions of inde-
pendent devices, each of which can describe by differential and algebraic equations
[87].
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3.2.2 Data Verification and Preprocessing
The main purpose of the proposed model is to assure the accuracy and reliability of
input data. This involves the process that eliminates the noises of input data caused
by inconsistency data points of the empirical distribution. accuracy, availability, and
statistical model distribution are considered as three data types of integrity constraints
in the proposed model. Among all, the input data is assumed to have high accuracy
and reliability in order to construct a distribution model. The records in input data
should be continuous in a certain time period, otherwise, accurate short-term predic-
tion cannot be guaranteed. In this integrity check module, some incomplete/missing
and duplicated data points are detected. This operation guarantees, the input data
from the metered loads corresponding to occupancy information before identifying
appropriate models. Based on time-related factors such as the weather differs (tem-
perature load) in different seasons, the mathematical relationship between energy
consumption and occupancy can be varied and so as the consumption in weekdays,
weekends, and special holidays. All input data are classified in this step by the time
of day, the day of a week, the week of a month and the month of the year to re-
duce the error produced by time-related factors. The length of intervals selected for
processing depends on prediction purpose (short-term or long-term prediction). For
different classification levels, the parameters to determine the fittest model should
change dynamically with different patterns.
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3.3 Regression Models Incorporating Occupant
and Metered Datasets
Human activities and movement patterns are inter-correlated with respect to their
existence in a building as well as their contribution to energy consumption within the
building. To answer how regression models can be built to identify the quantitative
interdependency between human movement patterns and the number of occupants.
The sensitivity of the patterns to the number of occupants is studied within a time-
frame. As shown in Fig. 3.1, this section is a hybrid regression analysis to establish
a load profile based on the metering and occupancy datasets.
3.3.1 Statistical Model Formulation
Even though the occupancy is dynamic, it is restricted by human activity patterns.
The change follows the corresponding regularity of customer behaviors. Hence, re-
gression analysis can be utilized to identify the quantitative interdependency between
the independent energy consumption and dependent occupancy. Ideally, a simple
linear model is probably the most direct approach to correlate the relationship be-
tween the variables. However, most actual data correlation may not exhibit a linear
phenomenon, as a result, adaptive measures with hybrid functions are necessary to
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capture the patterns precisely. Sometimes such cases vary that may accord with
the trend of quadratic, cubic, or higher orders. The proposed method incorporates
five most possible types of load fitting functions for modeling the relationship. The
five regression models include linear, logarithmic, quadratic, cubic, and exponential
models.
The regression coefficients can be calculated based on the least squares analysis and
the unobserved random error of residual terms can be eliminated because calculations
during the regression analysis follow a normal distribution of these error terms. The
identification of the load modeling equations of different datasets can be based on the
comparison of fitting coefficients from the five models mentioned before.
3.3.2 Model Validation
The module is a deterministic process to validate statistically from the preliminary
formulation in the previous section. There are three tests to be evaluated which are
based on (i) R-squared test, (ii) F-test, and (iii) significance test. These tests are to
ensure consistencies of overall statistical distribution models that would best fit into
the distribution model. As an important indicator in regression analysis, R-squared is
the coefficient of determination, which not only indicates the goodness of fit but can
also be interpreted as the amount of variation of the dependent variable explained by
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the regression equation [88]. Generally, an R-squared of 0.75 indicates a reasonable
correlation between energy consumption and the occupancy level [89]. F-values, which
are created by the F-test [90], should be greater than interrelated critical values in the
F-distribution table. The significance test, shown as “Sig.”, shows the result of the
statistical testing of significance. The value of this test result should be smaller than
0.05. In contrast, a meaning result of statistical testing should exhibit a significant
difference between the F-test and significance test that would reflect on the observed
data points and computed values.
The regression model of statistical curve fitting would require passing through the
aforementioned three tests in order to form a reasonably justified hybrid model. The
R-squared test must be executed after F-test and significant test. If any of the
two fails, then R-squared will not be initiated. Different test model would have the
minimum threshold value, e.g., the R-squared test with at least 0.75. However, we
use at least 0.8 value in our study as the threshold of the R-squared test because it
improves the fitness of the proposed model and avoids overfitting.
3.3.3 Adjustment of Dataset
This module will be applied only when the R-square test of the 10 given candidate
models in model validation cannot meet the requirement. Withdraw the last 10
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percent samples to format two new training sets and re-perform statistical model
formulation. Repeat the iterative procedure until the model satisfies the criterion.
Therefore, the proposed model may be a finite mixture of regression models.
3.4 Regression Analysis for a Case Study
This section is to validate the proposed regression analysis with the realistic load
metering datasets of a campus building in Michigan Tech. The occupancy information
is estimated based on the classroom schedule and students registration status using
Fall 2015 semester datasets.
The test building was selected because all of the three circuits associated with that
building have IP-based energy meters. This building is one of the high traffic build-
ing that has the most human movement that would be helpful for us to establish
a statistical study using the proposed models. The building is one of the highest
consumption loads across all campus buildings.
3.4.1 Time Windows of Metering and Occupancy Datasets
The time windows considered in this data gathering are based upon the consistent in-
tervals that are captured for occupancy and metering information. As most buildings
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follow the weekly routine and the weekly data pattern is typically chosen for regres-
sion analysis, the data is chosen based on the week interval during the test period.
According to what we have proposed in this work, it is best to build a norm profile in
the third week of the semester. The time windows of the Fall 2015 semester datasets
are between September 28, 2015, and October 4, 2015. The number of enrollments
reflected on these weeks has shown relatively stable since students tend to confirm
the courses they wish are satisfied with the experience in the past two weeks. And it
is unlikely to change due to the low refund rate if they do so later in the semester.
The data transferred from the devices to the building management system via the
Internet link module (ILM) rather than wireless connection due to the higher data
reliability. The occupancy information is mainly gathered based on the students reg-
istration records from the administration database. The detailed course schedule can
be used to ensure the classroom location and its association with energy consumption
with a particular building. Also, this estimation includes the number of faculty mem-
bers, staffs, and graduate students who have their routine to the tested building. This
number varies building to building that can be insensitive to its others. As weekdays
and weekend may have statistical fluctuation, we only use five workdays data in this
study. In addition, the work days should also be divided into work hours and non-
work hours to improve the precision of the model. A unit time interval is selected for
processing depends on the precision preference and the practical situation. The time
duration is selected as 10 minutes in this case.
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3.4.2 Establishing Statistical Models without Temperature
Load Consideration
Figs. 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the initial regression model of work hours and non-work
hours sample data in the test building. The x-axis represents the number of occupants
and the y-axis is the energy consumption (kWh). Five regression models are applied
in this study based on Section III.A. The Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering is in this building and the total enrollments of students in fall 2015
were 511, which contains 319 undergraduate students and 192 graduate students.
The normal work hours are from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm while the main courses hours
concentrated on 10:00 am to 4:00 pm in that semester. The reason why the occupancy
excesses the total number of enrollments is because there are 20 staffs and 52 faculties
working here, the school of technology and IT department also share this building
and some courses can be registered by other departments students.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are the summary of the initial validation. Each column shows the
corresponding parameters to the five regression models. According to the validation
criteria, R- squared values of all models in Fig. 3.3 is larger than or close to 0.75,
the F-values are far greater than the critical values in the F-distribution table, and
the Sig. values are all 0s which are smaller than 0.05. Each of the columns shows
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Figure 3.2: Model 1: Statistical regression models on test building.
consistently that they are more within their threshold values. However, all of the R-
squared values in Fig. 3.2 are less than 0.75. The adjustment section will be applied
in the work hours dataset to construct a hybrid model, which is shown in Fig. 3.4,
to meet the requirements of the criteria. Table 3.3 is the validation summary of the
hybrid model. The weight values of submodels in work hours model are approximate
to 0.66 (208 points), 0.21 (65 points), and 0.13 (42 points) and the model types are
quadratic, linear, and quadratic, respectively. The type of non-work hours model is
cubic.
64
Figure 3.3: Initial regression models of non-work hours sample data in
work days on the test load.
Table 3.1
Sample Data of Initial Validation Summary During the Work Hours on the
Test Load.
Model R-squared F Sig.
Linear 0.701 852.967 0
Logarithmic 0.618 586.650 0
Quadratic 0.712 448.168 0
Cubic 0.730 324.698 0
Exponential 0.733 994.813 0
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Table 3.2
Sample Data of Initial Validation Summary During the Non-Work Hours
on the Test Load.
Model R-squared F Sig.
Linear 0.775 1216.247 0
Logarithmic 0.765 1148.546 0
Quadratic 0.805 727.834 0
Cubic 0.806 485.283 0
Exponential 0.744 1024.174 0
Figure 3.4: Hybrid regression model of work hours in work days on the
test load.
3.4.3 Study Results
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the error rate analysis between the overall regression
model and the true value captured from a random week without consideration of
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Table 3.3
Validation Summary of Hybrid Regression for the Test Load.
Model R-squared F Sig.
Sub1 0.801 561.181 0
Sub2 0.833 833.998 0
Sub3 0.788 603.268 0
weather factor. Two pairs of the data which include the cumulative occupancy and
the total energy consumption within different time durations were randomly selected.
Among all, one was selected from the accumulation points of work hours while another
one was in non-work hours.
Table 3.4
Error Rate Analysis of the Test Building in Work Hours.
Model Occupancy (#) Energy (kWh) Error Rate (%)
Actual 263 361.63 -
Model: Cubic 263 372.54 3.016
Table 3.5
Error Rate Analysis of the Test Building in Non-Work Hours.
Model Occupancy (#) Energy (kWh) Error Rate (%)
Actual 43 351.28 -
Model: Cubic 43 346.57 1.341
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the number of occupants and the observed value of energy
consumption of a campus building, i.e., test building, are 263 and 361.63, 43 and
351.28 respectively. The error rates of regression models chosen from the proposed
model are under 3%, which are in an acceptable range. The error includes the statis-
tical error in data collection and the error might be caused by other factors such as
the abnormal weather or special events. Predictably, more sample data (monthly or
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quarterly, not yearly because the influence factors are distinct) and more uncertain
factors considered can construct a more accurate regression model.
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Chapter 4
Enhancement of Electrical Load
Characterization
4.1 Introduction
Load modeling has been an important subject in understanding demand response and
energy management [91]. In operational planning, load models play a crucial factor
to estimate losses as well as to ensure voltage profiles of feeders fall within operating
limits [92, 93]. All customers under one feeder represent thousands of electrical loads.
Ideally, each load should be metered with an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)
device to report their energy consumption. Although the average AMI coverage in
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the US power utilities has risen [48, 49, 81], modeling individual load consumption
accurately within a distribution feeder has been challenging due to the limited me-
tering points in the networks. Due to diversity and load variation, an ongoing survey
on specific profiles of unmetered loads has been conducted constantly [94, 95]. Ap-
proximate methods have been used to gauge the weighting factors of individual loads
which can be studied from a survey or to estimate them using allocation factors based
on transformer ratings associated with a root node of the metering point [95].
Some utilities do not implement full smart meter deployment. Hence, their load
models for each household are often updated regularly. Such labor-intensive statistics
may not describe their consumption activities. A heterogeneous alternative to char-
acterize their movements would establish a new profile of load models that can be
incorporated. A load profile can be enriched with a balance of flexibility and a certain
degree of complexity. An advanced algorithm can be established to discover the new
load patterns based on consumers’ dynamic behaviors. Consumption of electricity
can be irregular since the occupants’ activities may not always be uniforms, such as
adjustment of HVAC, heat produced by customers, and their activities, e.g., lights
and plugs; thus, an enhancement of electrical load modeling should be found to cor-
relate with occupants movements and their physical existence and relevancy in their
electricity consumptions. The common profile establishment is often a specific snap-
shot by a random survey to a household that cannot thoroughly represent other load
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similarities as each load is unique [91]. However, characterization of consumers’ phys-
ical existence to their electricity consumptions can be correlated and incorporated in
the existing load model.
In transportation engineering, the study of human mobility can regularly infer traffic
conditions from the cellular devices by tracking their positions [84, 85, 86, 96]. A data
analytic correlates information based on a regression framework to model electrical
usage [97, 98, 99]. From the recent studies [97, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105], the
occupants’ behavioral data input can be synthesized to optimally curtail electrical
loads. A framework can be established to enhance the dynamic behavior of occupants.
Derived occupancy datasets and their energy usages are combined based on the data
from the US Energy Information Agency (EIA) or the American Time Use Survey
(ATUS). In addition, environmental parameters, such as temperature and humidity,
are included in the studies to discover patterns of a given building [99, 104, 106, 107].
Sometimes, the effects of occupancy may not be noticeable. There are numerous
examples such as large industrial/agricultural facilities and automation that can be
insensitive to the existence of occupants at site, e.g., server farms, refineries and
chemical plants, cold-storage facilities, irrigation pumps. In addition, in commercial
and residential buildings load error may often be closely related to weather.
However, the occupancy-consumption correlation in a residential area can be obvious.
For example, customers would adjust the settings of the heating, ventilating and
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air conditioning (HVAC) system when they are at their residence. Prediction and
utilization of energy usage at the appliance level can be estimated and improved
[108, 109, 110, 111, 112]. Control management of local electricity usages is further
investigated based on oﬄine occupancy and demand response with improved methods
[97, 101, 106, 113, 114, 115, 116].
Fundamentally, Fig. 4.1 shows the statistical correlation between occupants’ move-
ment and their energy consumption associated with metering devices. These loads
are spatially correlated and associated to metered and unmetered zones. The four
clusters in green represent the electrical loads with smart meters, which can be used to
calibrate the proposed model directly. The three scenarios with different time indexes
show diverse occupancy densities. As the ideal case of the statistical curves illustrates
in Fig. 4.1, under normal circumstances, the power consumption in this area is ex-
pected to change at different time frames that are influenced by their existence closer
to the metering points. Under the preliminary study, these two distinct dimensions
of occupancy and electrical loads exhibit varying patterns that reveal their dynamics
[117]. However, the load variation may not obviously be discerned.
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Figure 4.1: Ideal correlation of human movements and electricity consump-
tion within a partial distribution feeder.
4.2 Enhanced Load Modeling Framework
Fig. 4.2 is the flowchart that presents the framework for this study. Variables con-
sidered in the formulation of the initial statistical regression model are the historical
power consumption data and the statistics of occupancy. The input dataset can be
obtained from the archived data of the previous period (daily, weekly, monthly, or
seasonally) that is not influenced by weather change distinctly throughout a year. We
select five basic statistical models as the candidates to establish the regression model.
Once none of the models can meet the requirements of the validation, the proposed
heuristic regression algorithm is applied to construct the initial combined regression
model α. In order to reduce the estimation error associated with loading conditions,
the weights are updated based on the structural deviation β [118].
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The initial statistical model formulation is derived from No,a and Po,a, which is for-
mulated as:
α = F̂t(No,a, Po,a) (4.1)
and the structural deviation of input of No,r and Po,r is
β = µ∆t(No,r, Po,r). (4.2)
Therefore, the next snapshot of load information is evaluated and integrated into the
calibrated model γ as follow:
γ = Ft+∆t(α, β, ε∆t). (4.3)
This achieves incremental learning. The description of each module in Fig. 4.2 is
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detailed in the following sections.
Figure 4.2: Flowchart of the proposed correlation framework.
4.2.1 Occupancy Data Availability
The daily statistical survey result of occupancy for a specific load with a regular energy
usage schedule e.g., commercial, industrial, or agricultural loads, can be obtained
based on the records of employee attendance sheets. This registration would be able
to determine the duration that an occupant would consume the electrical energy.
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All survey methods, however, can only provide a snapshot of information. Although
motion sensors can detect users’ motions near devices, massive system deployment can
be cost-ineffective. Furthermore, the dynamic presence of occupants can be inferred
by their cellular devices. To obtain the occupancy information based on this method,
we make assumptions that: (i) every user in an observed load area holds only one
unit and their devices are turned on, (ii) the estimated area is covered by Wi-Fi or
cellular network, (iii) the assisted GPS (A-GPS) of mobile phones provides location
accuracy up to 10 meters [119], and (iv) consumers’ consent to share their location
information.
4.2.2 Load Data Availability
The load survey is conducted based on consumption norm profiles that are observed
within a time frame. The types of load profile are based on (i) individual household,
(ii) consumer types, and (iii) the behavior of each load. Each profile can be col-
lected throughout a year so that the unique individual profiles can be captured and
established. Without IP-based metering devices, on-site readings of power consump-
tion are undertaken by crews on a monthly basis. In addition, an image extraction
method [83] can be utilized to obtain the real-time data from the eligible load as well.
Also important is real-time information from supervisory control and data acquisition
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(SCADA) [120]. This includes loading and voltage measurements by a limited num-
ber of metering devices installed along a distribution feeder. This feeder partition
is useful in simplifying the regression analysis of system observability enhancement
with a zonal approach.
Realistic scenario simulation may require a platform to integrate models for power
systems, energy markets, building technologies, and the plethora of other resources
that are becoming part of modern electricity production, delivery, and consumption
systems. We implemented an agent-based approach by generating the load datasets
using a multi-agent simulation engine including advanced algorithms that can deter-
mine the simultaneous state of millions of independent devices, each of which can
be described by differential and algebraic equations [121]. The simulated outputs
emulate data collection from the AMI that has been verified and validated in this
study.
4.2.3 Agent-Based Modeling
An agent-based framework is proposed in this study for the sensitivity analysis be-
cause it enables a variety of third-party data management and utilization of other
modules as part of the ecosystem under a simulation environment. The implementa-
tion of agent-based model utilizes the existing simulator [121] to support unbalanced
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power flow for validation of sequential simulation test cases. The environment of open
sources enables flexible enhancement in the simulator.
4.2.3.1 Occupancy Estimation
Suppose AAve,o, which is the average area per occupant in an electrical load, only
contains two elements ‘400’ and ‘100,’ which represents the square foot that one oc-
cupant needed in residential and non-residential areas, respectively. Then the average
number of occupants in the target load generated from the agent-based model, Oa
can be calculated by
Oa = rnd
[(ATotal,o
AAve,o
)
·Nfloor
]
. (4.4)
where ATotal,o is the total floor area of electrical load region and Nfloor represents the
number of floors in an electrical load.
Figure 4.3: Ideal occupancy rate of a load area.
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The aim of estimating Oa in a load is mainly to generate real-time occupancy data
based on the dynamic occupancy rate. The solid curve in Fig. 4.3 demonstrates
the ideal occupancy rate ro(t) in a non-residential load and the reverse of the curve
displayed as the dashed line in the figure is the rate in a residential load. The values
of the occupancy rate can vary according to the settings of maximum and minimum
values and the different start t′ and end t′′ times of work hours. Overall, the increase
and decrease of this rate are on the basis of quadratic function. The steady-state
segment within this curve is not strictly linear. The Ot of a load is represented as
(4.5):
Ot = Oa · ro(t). (4.5)
4.2.3.2 Generation of Electrical Usage Datasets
Since the existing “occupantload” module in the simulator only consider the power
consumption of heat gains [122], seven modules: 1) base load, 2) occupantload, 3)
lights, 4) waterheater, 5) HVAC, 6) plugs, and 7) error consumption, are modified
and designed in the proposed system [87]. A new property named as “occupancy”
is added in modules: occupantload, lights, and plugs based on Eqs. (4.4) and (4.5).
79
The working schedule of each module is set according to human movement and be-
havior habits. Some default values such as the floor area in lights module and heat
gains in “occupantload” are adjusted to meet simulation requirements. Consider a
few occupants may neglect to turn off their appliances such as lights and laptops,
or leave devices for charging. There may be extra power consumptions without any
occupants’ activities. The extra power consumption of each occupant is assigned with
a number based on the statistics that may represent error consumption. The time
frame to consider the error consumption should exclude the duration that the corre-
sponding area is occupied. Therefore, simulated Pt from the model can be calculated
by summing up power consumption generated from all modules and then minus the
value from the error module.
A primary verification of the modified model is performed before the application. A
comparison of the generated power consumption results between the initial simulator
model and the modified model incorporated with the new property “Occupancy” is
utilized to prove the validation of the changes in the source code. Once the difference
of the time-varying consumption between these two is only influenced by the differ-
ent number of occupants in a test case, the modified model can be applied for the
simulation.
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4.2.4 Data Verification
This module aims at assuring accuracy and integrity of input data for the initial
statistical model α. This involves eliminating inconsistent or bad data points from
the empirical data distribution. Using the proposed methods, a constant input of
datasets is established under defined intervals. By setting this criterion, it is to
compare the magnitude of the data input between its former and later ones. If the
absolute values of these two differences are greater than the preset default error,
the input data is considered as abnormal and will be ignored in constructing models.
Some incomplete/missing or duplicated data points are verified in this integrity check
module. This assures the consistencies of individual load consumption corresponding
to occupancy information.
4.3 Regression Models Incorporating Estimated
Occupant and Consumption Datasets
Human movement and its patterns are inter-correlated with respect to their existence
in a specific load area as well as their contribution to power consumption. The
sensitivity of the patterns to the number of occupants is studied within a timeframe
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and how the hybrid regression model can be built by identifying the quantitative
interdependency between these two. This section is a heuristic regression approach
to establish a load profile based on the simulation of electrical loads and occupancy
datasets. This is an iterative process that adapts the parameterization based on the
observation.
4.3.1 Statistical Model Formulation
This module is the first part of the adaptive parameterization where it begins to de-
termine and establish a statistical distribution module between the two data sources.
A power and occupancy (PO) curve conversion is applied in this step. Under this
representation, the occupancy information is shown in x-axis and power consumption
corresponds to y-axis. The data points shown in diagram are the statistical distribu-
tions. An observation may have more than one cluster. For example, in Fig 4.4, the
scatter diagram has three clusters with different time durations. The observation in
the work hours and inactive time display a steady occupancy relatively correlating
to power consumptions, while the other cluster deviates from the other two. Hence,
a threshold is set to decide if the dataset needs to be partitioned according to the
standard deviation of clusters. Ideally, the linear model should be the most direct
approach to correlate the relationship between the variables. However, most actual
data correlation may not exhibit linear dependencies, as a result, adaptive measures
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with hybrid functions are necessary to capture the patterns precisely.
Determination of the regression coefficient can be estimated based on least squares
analysis [123]. The unobserved random error of residual terms can be eliminated
because the regression analysis conforms to statistical normal distribution of these
error terms [123]. The identification of the load modeling of different data can be
based on the comparison of fitting coefficients between the aforementioned five models.
4.3.2 Model Validation
The module follows from the previous section is to validate statistical parameteriza-
tion from the preliminary formulation. There are four tests to be evaluated which
are based on: (i) R-squared test, (ii) F-test, (iii) significance test, and (iv) Geoffrey
E. Havers statistic (GEH) test [124].
R-squared test remains one of the important indicator in regression analysis is not de-
termined entirely based on the fittest of datasets, but it also can be used to intereprete
the variation and its dependent variables [88]. A general case with R-squared test of
0.75 would exhibit reasonable correlations [89].
The GEH method is another test to validate the collected data points and to determine
the fitting outcome between the power consumption and the number of occupants in
83
a load area. The formulation of GEH is G =
√
2(m−c)2
m+c
. The benefit of using GEH
is that the model provides an iterative method to constantly update the estimated
value based on their statistical distribution in which the empirical norm output of
GEH should be within a reasonable range, i.e., less than 5.0.
The hybrid model of statistical curve fitting would require to pass through the afore-
mentioned four tests in order to form a reasonably justified hybrid model. The R-
squared test must be executed after the F-test, the significant test, and the GEH test
because these three tests are used to prove the input variables are able to construct
the regression model or the model is meaningful. If any of the three fails, then the R-
squared will not be initiated. Different test model would have the minimum threshold
value, e.g., the R-squared test with at least 0.75. However, we use at least 0.8 value
in our study as the threshold of R-squared test because it improves the fitness of the
proposed model.
4.3.3 Heuristic Regression Algorithm
The heuristic regression algorithm proposed here is based on the finite mixtures of
regression models for the best curve fitting. The Algorithm 1 is the pseudocode
that shows the iterative procedure how the regression parameter adjustment is be-
ing adapted for each iteration. The heuristic regression algorithm is summarized as
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follows:
1. Input the updated Ot and Pt;
2. Construct S by the OP paired points conversion that using Ot as the abscissa
and Pt as the ordinate;
3. Withdraw S ′ randomly from S and the remaining data as R, where S = S ′+R;
4. Apply each candidate model in CMm for R. If any model in CMm satisfy the
criterion ν, return this candidate model as the result model;
5. If the given models cannot satisfy ν, withdraw the last λ (or percent) points to
form RPart1 and RPart2;
6. Repeat fh
( ·) for all new training sets to find the best candidate model in CMm
to satisfy the criterion ν of each set and combine all results as M˜ rR,t;
7. If the given models still can not satisfy ν for the new training set, repeat fh
( · )
until Mh is constructed;
8. If there is not Mh till the last iteration, reduce the threshold value of the set
partition requirement by ρ and repeat fh
(
R,CMm, ν
)
;
9. Construct M˜ rR,t with cb
( · );
10. Utilize cross-validated S ′ to perform each iteration. If the average error rate
is reasonable, return M˜ rR,t; if not, repeat fh
(
R,CMm, ν
)
for S to calibrate the
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model.
The threshold of the validation criterion will affect the number of iterations. The
smaller the threshold value, the lesser the iterations it can be. The heuristic regression
algorithm builds models based on the following:
M˜ r(x, t) =
q∑
b=1
cb(x) · M˜ rb (x, t), cb(x) =

1 if x ∈ Rb,
0 if x /∈ Rb
(4.6)
where cb(·) is the input membership function in a subset while b is the index of a
sub-model and q is the number of sub models in the heuristic regression model.
The model types of CMm in different submodels could be the same but with different
adaptive parameters. The cross-validation applied here is to avoid overfitting. Typi-
cally, the test set selects around 10% or 20% points of the dataset randomly for each
iteration. The range of inference is based on the result from the heuristic regression
model. The Ir is the power consumption inference range and e
′ is the average error
of cross-validation that is updated iteratively and is in the range of M˜ r ± e′ · M˜ r.
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4.3.4 Update Parameters
In order to reduce the additional estimation error, the model should keep updating
based on the real-time income observation. Under normal circumstances, a subtle
change on the initial weights will be updated. However, under special circumstance
such as a special event with a large number of occupants but normal power consump-
tion is held in next time frame, the structure of the initial model could be changed.
Therefore, constant update on the model based on real-time sampling input is neces-
sary.
Figure 4.4: IEEE 13-node test feeder example of occupancy and residential
load with OP pairs conversion.
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4.4 Stimulated Case Study
This section is to validate the proposed heuristic model within the IEEE 13-node test
feeder and a distribution network that covers a geographical region. The information
is estimated for a day and the heuristic model is applied during the observation. The
evaluations of simulated results and allocation factor of unmetered values based on
occupancy is discussed in this section.
4.4.1 IEEE 13-Node Test Feeder
4.4.1.1 Test Case Description
An example of the time-series occupancy and power consumption in a residential area
was illustrated in this part. The simulation topology is the IEEE 13-node test feeder
and the test load area is the subfeeder of node 692 within the system as shown in Fig.
4.5. There are 10 residential loads connected with node 692 through a triplex meter to
record relevant consumption information of this load area. The triplex meter provides
a voltage to the house panel and the house provides a description of the current load
to the triplex meter.
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Figure 4.5: The detailed schematic diagram of the test subfeeder in the
IEEE 13-node test feeder.
The module “triplex meter” in this simulator provides a connection point between
the residential and relative powerflow modules. Therefore, every house needs a triplex
meter to connect to the electrical system (although multiple houses can connect to a
single triplex meter). Conceptually, the triplex meter can be modeled as the customer-
site meter, either electronically metered or manually obtained at sites. The secondary
triplex system in this simulator only represents the circuit as seen in a residential
house panel, or two 120-V circuits and one 240-V circuit. Commonly, the system is
designed as the “triplex line” connected to a “triplex node” at the secondary
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side of a center-tap or split-phase transformer [125].
The script consults the open source code of IEEE 13-node test feeder from [126]. We
keep the default settings of other nodes and update the properties of node 692. The
process of generating the electrical usage dataset in the agent-based model can be
summarized as follows:
1. Initial the average area of loads in the subfeeder of node 692 at around 1,200
ft2 with 30 occupants as the fixed households using Eq.(4.4).
2. The occupancy rate follows the curve trend shown in Fig. 4.3 and set the t′ =
9:00AM and t′′ = 5:00PM.
3. Add the new parameter “occupancy” to represent the occupancy rate (gener-
ated in Step 2) in modules: occupantload, lights, and plugs.
4. Set default values of power consumption for each occupant in modules
occupantload, lights, and plugs.
5. The heating schedule is set with five time durations: 0:00-6:59, 7:00-8:59, 9:00-
16:59, 17:00-21:59, and 22:00-23:59. The heating set points are 65◦F, 70◦F,
60◦F, 65◦F, 70◦F, respectively. The cooling set point is set as 81◦F.
6. The water demand schedule is set according to the occupancy rate and also
with five time durations same as the heating schedule in Step 4. The water
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demands are 0.01 gallons × “occupancy”, 0.3 gallons × “occupancy, random
between (0.1, 0.2) gallons × “occupancy, 0.3 gallons × “occupancy”, and 0.5
gallons × “occupancy”, respectively.
7. Set the heating schedule for HVAC (generated in Step 4) and water demand
schedule for waterhearter module (generated in Step 5).
8. Generate the base load randomly between the range from 1.5VA to 2.5VA per
half an hour and generate random error consumption for the test load area
between 8VA and 10VA per hour.
9. Input the topology of the whole test feeder into the agent-based model.
10. Generate the time-series power consumption of the tested subfeeder every 10
minutes.
4.4.1.2 Establishing Statistical Models
The curve figure before the OP pairs conversion in Fig. 4.4 demonstrates the time-
series occupancy and power consumption results in the subfeeder of IEEE 13-node
test feeder using the proposed agent-based model for one day. The curve of the power
consumption is obtained from the triplex meter connected with node 692. The left
axis represents the power consumption and the right axis is the number of occupants.
91
The scatter diagram in Fig. 4.4 shows the correlation between the occupancy and
the power consumption in the test area after data verification. The clusters of the
three time durations have distinct distributions. The occupancy and power consump-
tion during the work time (9:00-17:00) and inactive time (0:00-9:00) are relatively
stable while the change of power consumption corresponding to the varying number
of occupants is not distinct during these inactive time. However, the resultant trends
of the active times (17:00-24:00) conform to the occupancy-power presumption that
existence of additional occupants will result in more power consumption.
Five initial regression models are applied for the active time distributions as shown
in Fig. 4.6 to construct the initial statistical model formulation in this case. Tables
4.1 is the summary of the initial validation without the cross validation. For all
cadidate models under R-squared (column 1) in Table 4.1, none of them are larger
than the required value 0.8 despite all of the other three tests meet their requirements.
Therefore, the heuristic analysis is applied for curve-fitting adjustments.
Table 4.1
Sample data of initial validation summary of the test load area in IEEE
13-node test feeder.
Model R-squared F Sig. GEH
Linear 0.524 52.927 0 1.762
Logarithmic 0.630 81.767 0 2.309
Quadratic 0.731 63.736 0 1.323
Cubic 0.785 59.458 0 1.158
Exponential 0.526 53.369 0 1.614
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Figure 4.6: Initial regression analysis of one day sample data on test load
area of IEEE 13-node test feeder.
4.4.1.3 Heuristic Regression Model
This section discusses parameter modification for the five regression models in accor-
dance to the four satisfactory tests. According to Algorithm 1, the heuristic regression
analysis is as follows:
1. Withdraw 10 points randomly from the points set as the test set for cross
validation;
2. Since there is no candidate model that can satisfy the criterion, the resultant
model will be a hybrid model;
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3. Withdraw the last 10 percent points of the remaining points set to form two
new training sets;
4. Apply the five candidate regression models for these two new training sets.
These sets are used to find the best one to satisfy the criterion of each set.
Then, combine all results into the hybrid model;
5. The hybrid model with two submodels (cubic and linear) is constructed;
6. Utilize the test set to perform the cross validation, since the process is reason-
able, return the hybrid model as the initial statistical model.
The heuristic regression model is illustrated in Fig. 4.7. The hybrid model consists
of two submodels: cubic and linear. The R-square value of each submodel are higher
than 0.8 and the other three criterions are valid. Table 4.2 demonstrates the validation
summary of the hybrid model for data distributions in the test load area. The cross
validation column shows the maximum error rate of each model. Because the goodness
of fitting we selected is 0.8, it can be observed that the error rate is relatively high.
However, if the error rate is closer to 0%, it might be over-fitting and will not be
useful for inference.
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Figure 4.7: Heuristic regression analysis of one day sample data in the load
area of IEEE 13-node test feeder.
Table 4.2
Validation summary of heuristic regression for the active time distributions
in the load area of IEEE 13-node test feeder.
Model F Sig. GEH R2
Cross
Validation
Sub1 87.647 0 1.028 0.874
5.477%
Sub2 106.043 0 1.361 0.891
? Subs 1 & 2 represent 2 sub-models constructed by the heuristic algorithm.
4.4.1.4 Update Parameters and Study Results
In this case, we prefer to estimate the power consumption in 20:00 next day. In order
to update the parameters in M˜ r(i,t), real-time data of active time is generated from
17:00 to 19:50 in the next day as M˜ r(j,∆t) to the initial data set. As illustrated in Fig.
4.8, the structure of the hybrid model remain unchanged while the parameters are
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Figure 4.8: Updated regression model of upper branch in the test load area
of IEEE 13-node test feeder.
updated following the real-time data input.
A test meter is connected with a load randomly in this subfeeder. Since the con-
sumption relative parameters of each load are set as the same in the agent-based
simulator, and there are 10 loads in this area, the power consumption percentage of
each residence is around 10% in the subfeeder. Table 4.3 shows the error rate analysis
between the heuristic model and the value generated from the following time index.
The model selects the time as 20:00 with 25 occupants. The rows with “Generated”
and “Hybrid” correspond the estimation error of the whole subfeeder and the error
rate of the heuristic regression model is 0.535%, which is obviously in an acceptable
range. The other two rows demonstrate the error rate analysis between the estimation
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and the value gathered from the test meter in the random residential load. The error
rate is 1.72%.
Table 4.3
Error rate analysis of the IEEE-13 nodes test feeder load in a concentrated
interval.
Name Occupancy (#)
Power
Consumption (W)
Error
Rate (%)
Generated 25 1,043.34 -
Hybrid 25 1,048.92 0.535
Metered - 106.73 -
Estimated - 104.89 1.72
Distribution Substation
Houses
Distribution System Nodes
FRTU
Distribution Overhead Line
Distribution Underground Line
Test Feeder
FRTU-1 FRTU-2 FRTU-3
Load Area 1 Load Area 2 Load Area 3
Figure 4.9: The test distribution system in geographical proximity of two
focused areas.
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4.4.2 An Electrical Distribution System
4.4.2.1 Test Case Description
Fig. 4.9 is the geographical region of the distribution test network. There are 3
substations, 1 665 distribution nodes, and 1 644 houses (include residential and non-
residential). The conductor data for the overhead line are selected by the types of
556 500 26/7 ACSR and 4/0 6/1 ACSR while the configuration of conductor for the
underground line is 250 000 AA. The detailed schematic diagram in Fig. 4.9 illustrates
a test feeder with three feeder remote terminal units (FRTUs) in this network and
the loads are indicated by arrows. The heuristic regression model is tested in Load
Area 2 in this feeder. This area is selected because all of the loads in this area are
non-residential while the load types in Load Areas 1 and 3 are hybrid. There are six
subfeeders connected to this load area. The electricity usage of each subfeeder is equal
and then the consumption percentage of each subfeeder is around 16.67%. In relative
terms, the residential load is more sensitive than the non-residential load because an
occupancy change can be observed with apparent variation in their consumption.
The process of generating the power consumption datasets is similar as the IEEE
13-node test feeder example. The settings of t′, t′′, heating and cooling set points,
and water demand schedule are same as the previous case. However, we initial the
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average areas of all loads in the system according to the geographical information
gathered from the related software [127]. The average area of the Load Area 2 is
around 24 000 ft2 while there are 240 occupants are fixed personnel based on Eq.
(4.4). In addition, the base load changes from 4.5VA to 5.5VA per half an hour and
the error consumption is generated randomly from 5VA to 8VA per half an hour.
Since the temperature may affect the simulation result, this study is assumed to be
in a season that does not fluctuate a significant change in temperature.
Figure 4.10: Occupancy and power consumption results in the non-
residential load area (Load Area 2).
4.4.2.2 Establishing Statistical Models
The time-series power consumption results in these three FRTUs are shown in Fig.
4.10. Therefore, we can determine the consumption difference in the non-residential
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Figure 4.11: Initial regression models of one day sample data in the non-
residential load area (Load Area 2).
area (Load Area 2) by subtracting the FRTU-3’s values from FRTU-2. The result
and the occupancy curve are also shown in Fig. 4.10.
The OP paires in Fig. 4.11 demonstrates the sample data for the Load Area 2.
Five candidate regression models are applied in this study based on Section III.A.
To improve the precision of regression models, the observed data cluster represents
the correlation during work hours with relatively stable power consumption is not
analyzed. The simulation on this load area is based on the points distributions in
non-work hours.
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Tables 4.4 is the summary of initial validation without cross validation. Each column
shows the corresponding parameters to the five regression models. For all regression
models are less than 0.8 shown in Tables 4.4 under R-squared (column 1). This
exhibits reasonable results for the R-squared test. However, for the other three tests,
each of the columns shows consistently that they are more within their threshold
values; column 2 satisfies the threshold from F-distribution table, column 3 is with
less than 0.05, and column 4 is less than 5. Under this circumstance, the heuristic
algorithm continues to adjust until it reaches a convergence.
4.4.2.3 Heuristic Regression Model
According to Algorithm 1, we have withdrawn 10 points randomly as Γ and the
algorithm will withdraw the last 20 percent (λ) points to process the heuristic re-
gression algorithm for training generated sets, respectively. The algorithm repeats
Fh(·) until it has met the criteria. The cross validation is performed to check ecv
of the constructed hybrid model. If the result is reasonably established, the hybrid
model will be utilized for inferring power consumption in the following time stamp.
As the database of R grows with real-time observation input, the regression model is
updated constantly to refine the regression model for prediction.
Figs. 4.12 illustrates the heuristical regression model for the non-residential area
(Load Area 2). The hybrid regression model consists of two subsets. The R-squared
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Table 4.4
Sample data of initial validation summary in the non-residential load area
(Load Area 2).
Model R-squared F Sig. GEH
Linear 0.715 799.879 0 2.11
Logarithmic 0.659 182.050 0 1.145
Quadratic 0.781 423.345 0 1.091
Cubic 0.783 284.988 0 1.104
Exponential 0.678 673.629 0 2.120
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Figure 4.12: Heuristic regression analysis of one day sample data on the
residential load area.
value of each submodel are higher than 0.8 and the other three criterions are valid.
Table 4.5 shows the validation summary of heuristic regression model for the the
residential load area. The model types of submodels are logarithmic and quadratic.
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Table 4.5
Validation summary of heuristic regression for the non-residential load area
(Load Area 2).
Model F Sig. GEH R2
Cross
Validation
Sub1 803.357 0 2.119 0.895
5.468%
Sub2 465.821 0 2.061 0.802
? Subs 1 & 2 represent the 2 sub-models constructed by the heuristic algorithm.
4.4.2.4 Study Results
Similar to the previous case, we connected a test meter with a subfeeder randomly
in this test load area. The regression model is setup with parameters of time as 7:40
and 180 occupants. The structure of the regression model remains unchanged while
the parameters of models are updated following the real-time data input. Table 4.6
illustrates the error rate analysis between the heuristic models, and the value captured
from the following time index by the test meter.
The error rates of heuristic regression models are under 5%, which are in an acceptable
range based on (4.7).
Ir ∈
(
M˜ r ± ecv · M˜ r
)
. (4.7)
where Mh(x) is the result from (4.6) and ecv is the maximum error rate of the cross
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Table 4.6
Error rate analysis of the test load in concentrated interval.
Name Occupancy (#)
Power
Consumption (kW)
Error
Rate (%)
Load Area 2 180 791.104 -
Hybrid 180 801.436 1.306
Metered - 136.393 -
Estimated - 133.572 2.068
validation.
The error includes the statistical error in data estimation and the error might be
caused by other factors such as the existing internal modules and default parameters
in the simulator for estimating power consumption. In practice, the the percentage
of energy consumption for each subfeeder in a load area can be estimated based on
archived data.
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Algorithm 1 Heuristic Regression Algorithm
Require:
S: A set of OP paired points based on Ot and Pt.
S ′: A test set for cross-validation.
R: A training set to construct a regression model.
fh
( · ): Iteration function of heuristic regression.
CMm: A set of candidate models, where m is the index for candidate models,
m = 1, 2, · · ·
ν: Test criteria to validate a regression model.
n: Number of elements in R.
nmin: Minimum number of elements in R can partition set in the heuristic regres-
sion algorithm.
λ, ρ: Adjustment parameters.
Input: Ot, Pt
1: Construct S.
Iteration Process: Withdraw S ′ from S and left R.
2: if fh
(
R,CMm, ν
)
satisfy ν then
3: M˜ r(R, t)← fh
(
R,CMm, ν
)
;
4: return M˜ r(R, t);
5: else
6: while n ≥ nmin do
7: RPart1 ← R(1, 2, · · · , λ),
RPart2 ← R(λ+ 1, · · · , n).
8: Do fh
(
RPart1, CMm, ν
)
, fh(RPart2, CMm, ν)
9:
M˜ r(R, t) =
{
M˜ rPart1,t = fh
(
RPart1, CMm, ν
)
, R ∈ RPart1
M˜ rPart2,t = fh
(
RPart2, CMm, ν
)
, R ∈ RPart2.
10: end while
11: end if
12: if No M˜ r(R, t) generated. then
13: Reduce nmin by ρ;
14: Do fh
(
R,CMm, ν
)
15: end if
Cross-Validation: M˜ r(R, t)
16: Using S ′ to evaluate cross-validation.
17: if Average cross-validation is reasonable then
18: return M˜ r(R, t).
19: else
20: R← S;
21: fh
(
R,CMm, ν
)
22: end if
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Chapter 5
Enhancement of Load Modeling by
Correlating Between Occupancy
and Consumption
5.1 Introduction
Although the rough requirement for accurate load models has been achieved by
electrical researchers and engineers, more research is imperative to update existing
load models and understand characteristics of modern loads with emerging smart
grid technologies such as distributed generators (DGs), electric vehicles (EVs), and
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demand-side management (DSM) [91]. The most uncertainty and difficulty of load
modeling come from the lack of real-time measurements and detailed load information
[48, 49, 81]. Due to load diversity and variation, an ongoing survey on specific profiles
of unmetered loads has been conducted constantly [94, 95]. For load model structure
development, more sophisticated models that balance flexibility and complexity are
needed. Since load consumption is time-varying due to human behaviors, different
load models may be found in different time periods. Conventional load modeling
methods using measurement data in a certain period may not be able to capture
time-varying load behaviors and lack generalizability. More research is needed to
develop advanced algorithms to perform online load modeling using the real-time
data. After developing new load models, they should be integrated in power system
analysis.
Since some utilities do not implement full smart meter deployment, approximate
methods have been used to gauge the weighting factors of individual loads which can
be studied from a survey or to estimate using allocation factors based on transformer
ratings associated with a root node of the metering point [95] are utilized for planning
purpose, while the operational load models are typically constructed with a combi-
nation of the geographic information system (GIS) and the data management system
(DMS) information. Hence, the operational load models for each household are often
updated manually by their crew. Such labor-intensive statistics may not describe
their consumption activities.
108
Prediction and utilization of energy usage at appliance level can be estimated and
improved [108, 109, 110, 111, 112]. Control management of local electricity usages is
further investigated based on oﬄine occupancy and demand response with improved
methods [97, 101, 106, 113, 114, 115, 116]. The statistical correlation between occu-
pants’ movement and their electricity consumption associated with metering devices
has been shown in last chapter. This chapter is prefer to apply the realistic load
metering datasets to validate the proposed correlation model and method.
5.2 Enhanced Load Modeling Framework
Fig. 5.1 is the flowchart that presents the framework for this study. Variables con-
sidered in the formulation of the initial statistical regression model are the OP paired
points generated from the historical power consumption data and the statistics of
occupancy. The input dataset can be obtained from the archived data of the previ-
ous period (daily, weekly, monthly, or seasonally) that is not influenced by weather
change distinctly throughout a year. Some selected basic statistical models (such as
linear, qudratic, cubic, exponential, etc.) as the candidates to establish the regression
model. Once none of the models can meet the requirements of the validation, the
proposed heuristic regression algorithm is applied to construct a priorio estimation
regression model, M˜ r(i,t), for OP paired points i during time interval t, which repre-
sents the observation time interval, i.e. sampling time interval. In order to reduce
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the estimation error associated with loading conditions, the weights of the regression
model are updated based on the real-time data points j input within the time shift ∆t
[118]. The estimation model based on the archived data is as 5.1 and the calibrated
estimation model is formulated as 5.2:
Figure 5.1: Flowchart of the proposed correlation framework.
M˜ r(i,t) = f [O(t), P (t)] + w(t) (5.1)
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M r(i,τ) = f [O(τ), P (τ)] + w(τ) = M˜
r
(i,t) + M˜
r
(j,∆t)
(5.2)
where τ represents the aggregated time intervals and τ = t + ∆t. O(t) and P (t) are
data sets of archived statistics of occupancy and human related electrical loads during
time interval t. w is random (white) disturbance (or process noise) vector which is
assumed to follow a normal distribution with zero mean, that w(t) ∼ N (0, Q(t)) where
Q(t) is the covariance. f is the system vector function 5.3 where n is the number of
sub-models generated from the regression process and fk() is any nonlinear or linear
function.
f =

f1()
f2()
...
fk()

. (5.3)
Once the establishment is made, it is used as the ongoing training to estimate the
consumption for the current time index. Theoretically, only the a priori model M˜ ri,t,
reflecting prior survey data and surveillance information up to the previous time
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index, is available before performing the real-time estimation. Therefore, the real-
time demand M ri,τ in the following study is modeled as a linear combination of the a
priori estimate, the real-time estimation, and the random disturbance.
5.2.1 Occupancy Data Availability
As mentioned in Chapter 4, the study of human mobility can regularly infer traffic
conditions from the cellular devices by tracking their positions [84, 85, 86, 96]. A re-
gression framework can be established to enhance the dynamic behavior of occupants
[97, 98, 99]. The dynamic presence of occupants can be inferred by their cellular
devices.
5.2.2 Load Data Availability
Ideally, each consumer can be collected real-time data through smart meters so that
unique individual profiles can be established. Without IP-based metering devices,
on-site readings of power consumption are undertaken by crews on monthly basis.
To improve the reading efficiency, an image extraction method [83] can be utilized to
obtain the real-time data from the eligible load. Also important is real-time infor-
mation from supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) [120]. This includes
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loading and voltage measurements by a limited number of metering devices installed
along a distribution feeder. This feeder partition is useful in simplifying the regression
analysis of system observability enhancement with a zonal approach.
5.2.3 Assumptions
5.2.3.1 Assumptions of Data Collection
The effects of occupancy are sometimes not noticeable. There are numerous examples
such as large industrial facilities or agricultural facilities and automation that can be
insensitive to the existence of occupants at the site, e.g., server farms, refineries and
chemical plants, cold-storage facilities, irrigation pumps. In addition, in some com-
mercial and residential buildings, load differ may often be closely related to weather
but the related adjustment is controlled by the smart thermostats. During the occu-
pancy data collection, many consumers may not be willing to provide their locations
or information. In view of above, some assumptions should be declared in this part:
† The focus of this research addresses residential or non-residential loads with
time-varying consumptions.
† The sensitivity of occupant existence is subject to the type of loads. The elec-
trical load types in this study are sensitive to consumers’ existences within the
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building or otherwise.
† There are no automatic adjustment device or smart equipment such as smart
thermostats in the test area.
† There are several metering points within a feeder that would provide the data
acquisition of the lumped load. The utilities have the metering data from
SCADA/DMS system. These could include FRTU and substation RTU.
† The correlation approach is to harness the metering information together with
the occupancy datasets. A data exchange between utility and data providers
(aggregated data sources on occupancy) would establish this framework.
† If this paradigm were to be implemented, utilities would have to exchange in-
formation from the data providers that could constantly obtain the occupancy
information from the provider. The frequency of data exchange could be every
10 minutes.
† Every consumer consents to share their location information and holds only one
cellular device. Their devices are turned on. The estimated area is covered
by Wi-Fi or cellular network and the assisted GPS (A-GPS) of mobile phones
provides location accuracy up to 10 meters [119].
114
5.2.3.2 Assumptions of Regression
Most statistical tests rely upon certain assumptions about the variables used in the
analysis. When these assumptions have not met the results may not be trustworthy.
Several assumptions of regression are “robust” to the violation and others are fulfilled
in the proper design of a study. Specifically, the assumptions of the relationship of
variables, the reliability of measurement, and statistical characteristics should be
considered in this section.
† The relationship between the independent and dependent variables is linear.
The linearity assumption can best be tested with scatter plots. The 2D OP
pairs scatter diagram is an example illustrated in Fig. 5.2.
† All variables to be multivariate normal in this analysis.
† Multicollinearity occurs when the independent variables are not independent
from each other. An assumption is that there is little or no multicollinearity in
the input variables.
† Autocorrelation occurs when the residuals are not independent from each other.
Another assumption is that there is little or no autocorrelation in the input
variables.
† The last assumption the regression analysis makes is homoscedasticity.
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5.2.4 Data Verification
This module aims at assuring the accuracy and integrity of the input data for the
priorio statistical regression model M˜ r(i,t). This involves eliminating inconsistent or
bad data points from the empirical data distribution. Using the proposed methods,
a constant input of datasets is established under defined intervals. By setting this
criterion, it is equivalent to a moving average filtering process by replacing each
discrepant data point with the average of the neighboring data points defined within
a preset span (2Nnei + 1):
ys(i) =
1
2Nnei + 1
· (y(i+Nnei) + y(i+Nnei−1) + ...+ y(i−Nnei)). (5.4)
y(i) =

y(i), |y(i) − ys(i)| ≤ θ,
ys(i), |y(i) − ys(i)| > θ.
(5.5)
where y(i) is the ith OP paired point and Nnei is the number of neighboring data
points, i.e. OP paired points, on either side of y(i). y
s
(i) represents the smoothed
value from moving average filter for the ith OP paired point. θ is the preset default
threshold for data verification.
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The verification compares the magnitude of the data input and the smooth data
generated from Eq. 5.4. If the absolute values of these two differences are greater
than the preset default error, the input data is considered as abnormal and will be
replaced by the smooth data as shown in Eq. 5.5 to avoid data lacking. Some incom-
plete/missing or duplicated data points are verified in this integrity check module.
This assures the consistencies of the individual load consumption corresponding to
the occupancy information.
5.3 Regression Models Incorporating Estimated
Occupant and Consumption Datasets
Human movements and their patterns are inter-correlated with respect to their exis-
tence in a specific load area as well as their contributions to the power consumption.
The sensitivity of the patterns to the number of occupants is studied within a time-
frame and how the hybrid regression model can be built by identifying the quantitative
interdependency between these two. This section is a heuristic regression approach
to establish a load profile based on the simulation of electrical loads and occupancy
datasets. This is an iterative process that adapts the parameterization based on the
observation.
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5.3.1 Statistical Model Formulation
The OP paired points conversion is applied in this section. Under this representation,
the occupancy information is shown in the x-axis and the power consumption corre-
sponds to the y-axis. A time series 3D observation may also be illustrated with time
index as the z-axis. Fig. 5.2 shows OP paired points in 2D and 3D demonstration,
separately. The figure displays gathered data from five workdays, every 10 minutes
represent one time index in this study. Since the metering device in a single load oc-
curred a few faults during the test period, some abnormal readings exist in the time
series consumption change as an example indicated with an arrow, while the corre-
sponding OP paired points observations also display inconsistent points (indicated
with an arrow).
After the data verification process mentioned before, the load modeling identification
of different data based on the comparison of fitting coefficients (least squares values)
between the selected candidate regression models. Under normal circumstance, adap-
tive measures with hybrid functions generated from the heuristic regression algorithm
rather than a linear model are necessary to capture the patterns precisely.
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Figure 5.2: Time series occupancy and power consumption change and
converted 2D and 3D OP paired points.
5.3.2 Model Validation
As same as in the previous Chapter, there are four tests to be evaluated which are
based on (i) the R-squared test, (ii) the F-test, (iii) the significance test, and (iv) the
Geoffrey E. Havers statistic (GEH) test [124]. The R-squared value is also set as 0.8.
5.3.3 Heuristic Regression Algorithm
The heuristic regression algorithm has been proposed in last Chapter as Algorithm
1 is the pseudocode that shows the iterative procedure how the regression parameter
adjustment is being adapted for each iteration.
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5.3.4 Ongoing Training
In order to reduce the additional estimation error, the model should keep updating
based on the real-time income observations. Under normal circumstances, a subtle
change in the initial weights will be updated. However, under special circumstance
such as a special break with a relatively few number of occupants but the normal
power consumption is held in the next time frame, the structure of the initial model
could be changed. Therefore, the constant update on the model based on real-time
sampling input is necessary.
5.4 Stimulated Case Study
This section is to validate the proposed correlation analysis with the realistic load
metering datasets of an observed area. The occupancy information is estimated based
on the registration states and the area occupied schedule from Fall 2017 semester
datasets [128].
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5.4.1 Test Case Description
This observed area has a substation and four backup generating units. There are
three distribution feeders connected to the substation and each lumped load has a
primary and backup connection to one of those feeders. Two lumped loads under one
same feeder with five transformers are selected from the observed area to perform
the correlation analysis. Since all of the circuits associated with these loads have
IP-based energy meters and the lumped loads have high traffic that has the most
human movements, that would be helpful for us to establish statistical study using
the proposed framework. Furthermore, the lumped loads contain one of the highest
consumption across the whole observed area.
5.4.2 Time Windows of Metering and Occupancy Datasets
The time windows considered in this data gathering are based upon the consistent
intervals that are captured for occupancy and metering information. To begin with
this process, we selectively picked a sample of datasets based on the weekly basis
that would typically use for regressions analysis. Under same weather season, the
weekly sample demonstrates the consistent patterns that can be built as a norm
profile for the lumped loads with metering and occupancy data. For an example,
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the comparison between past week with current one would always show consistent
information that can be captured to build the occupant-metered profile relations.
However, the monthly comparison may not be a reasonable data comparison for
establishing a reference profile statistically. The time windows of Fall 2017 datasets
are between October 2, 2017, and October 6, 2017. The number of enrollments
reflected on this time period has shown relatively stable.
The default value of how the power consumption (kW) is captured is every 10 minutes.
The connection between the distribution management system of the observed area
and the devices are being transferred using IP-based Internet link module (ILM).
The wired connection assures higher data reliability. The occupancy information is
carefully mapped to the registration records from the campus database to ensure
the classroom location and its association of energy consumption with a particular
area. This estimate includes not only the students who were taking the classes, but
also the number of faculty members, staffs, and graduate students who have their
routine to these areas. This number varies loads to loads that can be insensitive to
its others. Since weekdays and weekend may have statistical fluctuation, we only use
five weekdays data in this study.
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Figure 5.3: Initial regression analysis of 2D sample data on test lumped
loads.
5.4.2.1 Establishing Statistical Models
Fig. 5.3 illustrates the filtered sample data of the lumped loads in the 2D presen-
tation. The x-axis represents the number of occupants and the y-axis is the power
consumption (kW). Five regression models: 1) linear, 2) quadratic, 3) cubic, 4) power,
and 5) exponential, are selected in this case to construct the initial statistical model
formulations. Tables I is the summary of the initial validation without the cross-
validation. For all candidate models under R-squared (column 1) in Table 5.1, none
of them are larger than the required value 0.8 despite all of the other three tests
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meet their requirements. Therefore, the heuristic analysis is applied for curve-fitting
adjustments.
Table 5.1
Sample data of initial validation summary of test lumped loads.
Model R-squared F Sig. GEH
Linear 0.661 52.927 0 1.762
Quadratic 0.678 63.736 0 1.323
Cubic 0.679 59.458 0 1.158
Power 0.641 81.767 0 2.309
Exponential 0.652 53.369 0 1.614
Fig. 5.4 (a) demonstrates the 3D regression analysis based on the sample data of
the lumped loads. The x-axis represents the number of occupants, the y-axis is the
time index, and the z-axis represents the power consumption (kW). Apply the cubic
degree polynomial of two independent variables, x and y, to do the curve fitting,
a statistical model formulation of a dependent variable can be constructed. The
corresponding residuals plot (Fig. 5.4 (b)) shows the mean square values of residual
points. Even though several points with relatively high mean square errors, the overall
residual mean square error is around 32.5 in this study. Theoretically, the residual
mean square error closer to 0 indicates a fit that is more useful for prediction, but
it will cause overfitting. Therefore, we can define an estimation range based on the
calculated value from the formulation and the residual mean square error. Since
the R-squared value for this model is 0.8239 and all of the other three tests meet
their requirements, the 3D statistical formulation can be utilized for the consumption
estimation.
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Figure 5.4: Regression analysis of 3D sample data on test lumped loads.
5.4.2.2 Heuristic Regression Model
This section discusses candidate model selection, combination, and parameter mod-
ification according to the four satisfactory tests. According to the Algorithm 1, the
heuristic regression analysis is as follows:
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1. Scv is set as 10, which means withdraw 10 points randomly during each iteration
from the points set as the test set for cross-validation;
2. Since there is no candidate model that can satisfy the criterion, the resultant
model will be a hybrid model;
3. nmin is set as 10 and ρ is set as 1;
4. λ is set as 20, which means withdraw the last 20 percent of the remaining points
set to form two new training sets;
5. Apply the five selected candidate regression models for these two new training
sets;
6. Since there is still no candidate model that can satisfy the criterion during the
first iteration, partition each set as two new sets according to λ and continue
the iteration function;
7. Once the regression fitting of each subset satisfies the criterion, combine all
results into a hybrid model;
8. During each iteration, utilize the test set to perform the cross-validation and
calculate the average error rate. Since the value is reasonable, return the hybrid
model as the heuristic statistical model.
The heuristic regression model is illustrated in Fig. 5.5. The hybrid model consists
of 69 submodels and the types of this hybrid model contain linear, quadratic, and
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cubic. The average R-square value of the hybrid model is 0.8132 and each submodel’s
R-square value is higher than 0.8. The other three criterions are valid. The average
error rate of cross-validation is 5.477%. Because the goodness of fitting we selected
is 0.8, it can be observed that the error rate is relatively high. However, if the error
rate is closer to 0%, it might be overfitting and will not be useful for inference.
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Figure 5.5: Heuristic regression analysis of sample data in the lumped
loads.
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Figure 5.6: Updated hybrid regression model in the test lumped loads.
5.4.2.3 Ongoing Training and Study Results
In this case, we prefer to estimate the power consumption at 8:00 AM October 9 (next
Monday). In order to update the parameters in the initial hybrid regression model, a
set of real-time data is generated from 12:00 AM to 7:50 AM on October 9. Fig. 5.6
shows the updated hybrid regression model in 2D representation. As illustrated in
Fig. 5.6, the structure of the hybrid model remains unchanged while the parameters
are slightly updated following the real-time data input.
Table 5.2 shows the error rate analysis between the 2D heuristic model, the 3D
128
Table 5.2
Error rate analysis of the test lumped loads in a concentrated interval.
Name OCC. (#)
Time
Index
Power
Consumption (kW)
Error
Rate (%)
Metered 719 49 566.9 -
2D-Hybrid 719 49 581.809 2.63
3D-Model 719 49 578.011 1.96
regression model, and the metering value from the following time index. The model
selects the time index as 49 (8:00 AM) with around 719 occupants. The error rate
of the 2D hybrid model is 2.63% while the 3D model is 1.96%. Reference to the
cross-validation result and the power consumption inference range, Ir, the error rates
are in an acceptable range. The error includes the statistical error in data collection
and the error might be caused by other factors such as abnormal weather or special
events. Predictably, more sample data (monthly or seasonally, not yearly because the
influence factors such as climate are distinct) and more uncertain factors considered
can construct a more accurate regression model.
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Chapter 6
Switching Reconfiguration for
Anomaly Detection
6.1 Introduction
Data from utility meters (gas, electricity, water) is a rich source of information for
distribution companies beyond billing. The metering infrastructure has further ex-
tended from feeder head of a substation throughout the entire feeder loads. Each
load should be installed with an electronic meter to constantly observe the energy
consumption and to report consumer behaviors through SCADA in the near future.
The IP-based communication infrastructure has been gradually improved over time
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by extending single flow of information using automated metering reading (AMR)
to bi-directional information flow using AMI [95, 120]. Although AMI has improved
system reliability and observability within a feeder, application of digital smart me-
ters and addition of a cyber layer to the metering system introduce numerous new
vectors for energy stealing caused by meter tampering. While traditional mechanical
meters can only be compromised through physical tampering, in AMI, both local and
remote data corruption may occur; the metering data can be tampered before being
sent to the smart meters, inside the smart meters, and over the communication links
[129, 130].
Electrical energy stealing is a notorious problem in electric power systems and has
serious implications for both utility companies and legitimate users. The U.S., it is
estimated that utility companies lose billions of dollars in revenue every year [47, 131,
132], while in developing countries energy theft can amount to 50% of the total energy
delivered [46]. Energy stealing also leads to excessive energy consumption which may
cause equipment malfunction or damage [47], and often enables criminal activities,
such as the illegal production of substances.
Anomaly detection can be based on two references: sensors and profile. Sensors
are employed to monitor and supervise meters in customers’ level, the distribution
grid, and the communication network. However, the sensor system presents high
deployment and maintenance costs, and false alarms may happen during the detection
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process [133]. The anomaly detection based on profile analyzes significant variations
in consumption patterns [134]. In [135], the feeder remote terminal unit (FRTU)
helps narrow the search zone of energy stealing in smart home and community. In
[136], the authors proposed a state estimation algorithm utilizing the Kalman filter to
find measurement biases for energy usage abnormal detection. Also, [129] compares
the real values with the predicted values and apply statistical measures to detect
potential fraudulent activities and [137] detects anomalous meter readings on the
basis of models built using machine learning techniques on past data. A support
vector machine (SVM) classifier was trained in [130, 138] using consumption reports
from areas with a high probability of tampering. In addition, the anomaly detection
in electrical energy consumers using data mining was proposed in [139] and rough
sets were presented in [140].
The strategy of distribution system switch reconfiguration is utilized for fault local-
ization, isolation, system restoration, and optimizing the performance during those
procedures. In [141, 142], the authors deal with the problem of optimal reconfigu-
ration of radial distribution networks for minimum loss operations while [143, 144]
proposed an optimal strategy for switching devices considers costs of customer outage,
installation, as well as annual operation and maintenance. A switch reconfiguration
procedure was presented in [145, 146, 147, 148] for distribution system restoration with
maximizing the restored load and minimizing the number of switching operations and
the analyses in [145, 146] were based on graph theory. The main contribution of this
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paper is to combine the profile-based anomaly detection method with switching op-
erations of topology reconfiguration to localize the potential tampered load [149]. A
turnable threshold of anomaly will be applied to find the best balance between true
and false alarm rates. The line section being detected does not need to be isolated.
A graph-theoretic strategy for tampering detection based on profile comparison using
reconfiguration switching schemes is presented.
6.2 Profile-Based Anomaly Detection
The profile-based anomaly detection seeks to detect irregularity of potentially tam-
pered data by analyzing abnormal variations in short period consumption patterns.
A common assumption in all related works is the deployment of AMI or other real-
time meter reading method [83] is performed in the test region. The input dataset to
construct the consumption pattern can be obtained from the archived data of from
the previous short period that is sufficient to detect ongoing tampering.
An assumption is that offsetting tampers are not performed concurrently, e.g., cus-
tomer A’s consumption is raised while customer B’s consumption is lowered. Under
this condition, if the actual electricity usage displayed on the central billing center
is significantly higher or lower than the meter reading, anomaly (tampering) is sug-
gested. However, the number or amount of tampering in the whole grid is limited, it
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is inefficient to compare consumption patterns of all meters on the customer’s side.
A consumption comparison between the value displayed on the branch head and the
summation of all smart meter readings in its downstream can be utilized to localize
the tampered lumped loads with at least one tampering. Fig. 6.1 shows two situa-
tions with no tampering and at least one tampering in the branch. For the normal
one, the summation of meters’ reading (red curve) matches the actual usage (blue
curve). For the other one, the actual usage curve is higher than the summation of
meters’ reading (red curve).
Figure 6.1: An example of a normal smart meter vs. a tampered one.
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6.2.1 Threshold of Anomalies
The anomaly threshold of a smart meter identifies whether if a specific reading is
anomalous. It compares the current consumption curve with the pattern generated
from the previous short period. If the difference between two patterns is greater than
the user-defined threshold, the reading is anomalous.
For the comparison between the energy supplied by the grid and the energy reported
by smart meters, (6.1) shows the difference of these two in a subsystem during time
interval t,
∆ε(t) = εhead(t)− εloss(t)−
∑
εuser(t) (6.1)
where εhead(t) is the energy reported by the low-voltage grid meter (transformer,
FRTU, or the primary reading), εloss(t) is the technical losses, and εuser(t) is the
consumption report of the smart meter from the user side. An abnormal state is
triggered when ∆ε(t) exceeds the user-defined threshold.
The cost of the tampering detection procedure balanced versus the fraudulent cost
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can consider another threshold to decide whether or not to execute the following
switching procedure to localize the anomaly. In (6.2), pr(t) is the real-time price in
the subsystem and ∆c(t) is the fraudulent cost.
∆c(t) =
∑
pr(t) ·∆ε(t). (6.2)
6.2.2 Tampered Frequency
The tampered frequency of a smart meter is the ratio between the number of anoma-
lous readings and the total number of readings over a test period. Assume a smart
meter obtains the consumption information every τ in minutes, the tampered fre-
quency fF is shown in (6.3):
fF =
Na
60/τ · 24 ·Nd
(6.3)
where Na is the number of anomalous readings and Nd is the number of days during
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the test period. For example, assume that a typical smart meter sends out read-
ings every 10 minutes. Utility companies collect one month (30 days) data and 100
readings during this interval are anomalous, then the tampered frequency is around
2.3%. This frequency will be considered at the beginning of the switching procedure
to improve the searching efficiency.
6.3 Switching Strategies for Anomaly Detection
The distribution grid can be modeled by a graph G = (V,E) a set of vertices V
and a set of edges E. In G = (V,E), substations, distributed energy resources, and
distribution loads are referred to as vertices V . The overhead or underground lines
with switches are treated as edges E.
6.3.1 Conversion of Distribution Network to a Spanning Tree
A distribution network is constructed by interconnected distribution feeders and mi-
crogrids which can be modeled as virtual feeders in this study [150]. The feeders
are connected with each other through normally open tie switches. In the process
of representing the distribution network using a spanning tree, the vertices denote
substations or distributed energy resources are referred to as root nodes and lumped
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all root nodes together into one source node in the spanning tree. Since the tie switch
is installed in the feeder line section that coupling between the source node and dis-
tribution loads, all vertices are connected through the openable edges in the spanning
tree that does not contain any loop. An example of distribution network with four
sources and the corresponding spanning trees is shown in Fig. 6.2 where each subfig-
ure shows a possibility of reconfiguration. The conversion of the distribution network
to a spanning tree is the preliminary to perform the depth-first search (DFS) or other
relevant graph-theoretic strategies for switching schemes.
Figure 6.2: Spanning trees of an example distribution network.
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6.3.2 Convert Topology Graph to Adjacency or Incidence
Matrix
The adjacency matrix is a square |V |×|V | symmetric matrix that reflects the adjacen-
cies between vertices in a graph while the incidence matrix is a |V | × |E| matrix that
displays vertices and edges incidences [151]. These two matrices can be converted to
each other. Since the adjacency or incidence matrix can display the straightforward
interrelationship between vertices and edges, the matrix is employed to store and fix
the current connection state of the graph topology. Furthermore, this process con-
verts the graph model to the mathematic model which is machine recognizable. The
further relevant algorithm and analysis can be performed based on the matrix.
The Algorithm 2 is the pseudocode that shows the procedure that how the graph
converts to adjacency matrix. This algorithm can be used not only for a simple
virtual network but also a large and complex geographical related topology. The
algorithm is summarized as follows:
1. Require G = (V,E) where V is set of vertices and E is the set of edges;
2. Create a pairing function fpair which can uniquely encode two natural numbers
into a single natural number [152]. This function will take the x and y coordinate
individually and map it into a unique number that will not overlap with other
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xy-coordinate of combinations;
3. Make each edge’s start vertex which is close to the power source as the head
node and the end vertex as the tail node;
4. Perform fpair for each edge head and tail nodes;
5. Combine head and tail nodes together and unique the data string;
6. Renew the head and tail datasets with corresponding nodes indexes;
7. Initialize an empty adjacency matrix;
8. Check each edge in the graph, if the head index is not equal to the tail index,
indicate 1 as a connected state to the corresponding position in the adjacency
matrix;
9. After generating the adjacency matrix, convert it to the incidence matrix with
the existing method [153, 154];
10. Return the adjacency and incidence matrices.
Fig. 6.3 illustrates the sparsity visualization of the adjacency and incidence matrices
for the example topology. The adjacency matrix is symmetric (13 × 13) while the
incidence matrix is not (13 × 12). The E1 shown in Fig. 6.2 can be represented in
the matrix as a dot in Fig. 6.3. Since the graph is undirected, the nonzero elements
show the double number of connections in the spanning tree.
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Algorithm 2 Graph to Matrix Conversion Algorithm
Input:
G = (V,E)
Output:
1: Creat a pairing function fpair.
2: Head = fpair(xhead, yhead)
3: Tail = fpair(xtail, ytail)
4: Node = unique ([Head; Tail]).
5: Head = find (Head = Node).
6: Tail = find (Tail = Node).
7: % Initialization. Make sure this is a square matrix.
8: AdjM = zeros (length(Head), length(Head)).
9: for i = 1:length(Head) do
10: if Head(i) 6= Tail(i) then
11: AdjM (Head(i), Tail(i)) = 1.
12: AdjM (Tail(i), Head(i)) = 1.
13: else
14: AdjM (Head(i), Tail(i)) = 0.
15: end if
16: end for
17: Convert AdjM to IncM.
18: return AdjM, IncM.
6.3.3 Anomaly Inference with Switching Strategies
The Algorithm 3 is the pseudocode that shows the iterative procedure how the node
with tampered load(s) is localized for each iteration. The following variables are
defined as:
Mi Incidence matrix representing system topology. If vertex i is connected to edge
j, then Mi[i, j] = 1, otherwise, 0.
Ma Adjacent matrix representing system topology. If vertex i is adjacent to vertex
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Figure 6.3: Sparsity visualization of the adjacency and incidence matrices
for the example topology.
j, then Ma[i, j] = 1, otherwise, 0.
Vr Row vector indicating the open/close of switches/breakers/reclosers with
length |E|. If switch i is open Vr[i] = 0, otherwise, 1.
Vs Row vector indicating the location of power sources with length |V |. If vertex
i connected with a power source, then Vs[i] = 1, otherwise, 0.
If Index of RTU/FRTU that indicates there exists tampered load(s).
Vg Row vector indicating the location of distributed generators with length |V |.
If vertex i connected with a distributed generators, then Vg[i] = 1, otherwise,
0.
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Algorithm 3 Tampered Node Localization Algorithm
Input:
Mi, Vr, Vs
Iteration Fuction: Ff (Mi, Vr, Vs)
1: Mi ←Mi · V Tr .
2: Ma ←Mi ·MTi .
3: Replace all diagonal elements of Ma with 0.
4: % Initialization.
5: Vf ← Vs.
6: V̂f ← Vf · 0.
7: % Criteria that if the state is same as the previous iteration.
8: while Vf − V̂f 6= 0 do
9: V̂f ← Vf .
10: Vf ← V̂f ·Ma + V̂f .
11: end while
12: Replace all nonzero elements in Vf with 1.
13: return Vf .
14: % Localize the fraud.
15: Find all 0 elements in Vf .
16: while More than one tampered nodes in one feeder, change connection states of
switches to generate a new Vr. do
17: Repeat Ff (Ma, Vr, Vs).
18: end while
The algorithm proposed here process according to the graph-theoretic switching
strategies. A preassumption is a smart meter or tampering indicator is installed
in each feeder head. The algorithm starts with balancing the benefits of detecting the
tampering and then checking the node with the highest fraudulent frequency in the
fraudulent feeder first. The DFS is then performed to decide the following node to be
checked. Since the incidence matrix is constructed by vertices and edges, the chang-
ing of connection status can be displayed on this matrix directly, the input topology
in the Algorithm 3 is the incidence matrix. The algorithm is summarized as follows:
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1. Convert the incidence matrix to the adjacency matrix with current connection
status of switches for fraudulent nodes detection;
2. Initialize Vf with Vs and set V̂f as the previous iteration result of Vf and initialize
V̂f with 0;
3. Check every nodes status of each iteration by checking Vf = V̂f ;
4. If status of all nodes are stable, replace all nonzero elements in Vf with 1;
5. For the situation that more than one fraudulent nodes in one feeder, change
connection states of switches to generate a new Vr and repeat Ff (Mi, Vr, Vs);
6. Return Vf ;
7. Find 0 element(s) in Vf to localize the tampering node.
6.4 Anomaly Detection Analysis for Case Study
This section is to validate the proposed graph-theoretic strategy for anomaly detection
using reconfiguration switching schemes with a topology of a distribution system.
The procedures of changing connection status of switches to reconfigure the topology
and the detection results of potential attacked load nodes in each iteration will be
discussed in this section.
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6.4.1 Test Case Description
Fig. 6.4 is the topology of the distribution test network. There are two substations,
four source nodes, and 20 load nodes. The four switches at each feeder head are
deployed with a anomaly indicator or a smart meter to perform the profile-based
anomaly detection. The four load nodes with the highest tampered frequency at each
feeder are indicated by red boxes and the randomly generated tampered load node
is in a green circle. The corresponding spanning tree is shown in Fig. 6.5. The four
source nodes are lumped into a single source and the indicator installed in E4 infers
an anomaly that may be subject to anomaly.
Figure 6.4: Topology of distribution test network.
Fig. 6.6 illustrates the sparsity visualization of the adjacency and incidence matrices
for the case topology. The adjacency matrix is symmetric (21 × 21) while the inci-
dence matrix is not (21 × 20). As mentioned in Section III, Part B, the source node
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Figure 6.5: Spanning tree of a case.
S is treated as the node with index 1 while vertex 5 (V5) as node 2, vertex 6 (V6)
as node 3, and so on. The corresponding position of E4 has been indicated in Fig.
6.6. Since the graph is undirected, the nonzero elements show the double number of
connections in the spanning tree.
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Figure 6.6: Sparsity visualization of the adjacency and incidence matrices
for the case topology.
6.4.2 Switching Procedures
In all steps, since all source nodes are lumped as node S and it is the only source
node, the power source vector Vs = [1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0].
Step 1: Since V20 has the highest tampered frequency, the switching procedure starts
from checking the state of V20. As shown in Fig. 6.7 (a), we broke the switch between
V20 and V21 and closed the switch between V19 and V20 simultaneously. Since the
current connection status of the topology has been changed, we modified values on
corresponding positions in the input incidence matrix. The consumption reading of
the indicator installed in E3 displayed a corresponding increase but within a normal
range. The E4 still showed anomalous means the tampering was in the load node V21,
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V22, V23, or V24. The value of switch E4 in Vr is 0.
Figure 6.7: Graph representation of switching procedures.
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Step 2: This step is displayed in Fig. 6.7 (b). According to DFS, we then broke
the switch between V21 and V22 and closed the switch between V13 and V21 as shown
in the blue circle to check the state of V21. Similiar like in Step 1, the consumption
reading in E2 raised due to the additional load in V21 while the anomalous reading in
E4 indicated the tampering existed in V22, V23, or V24.
Step 3: As demonstrated in Fig. 6.7 (c), the search is following the connection
sequence within the abnormal feeder and this step is to check the state of V22. Re-
peat the switching operation to open the switch between V22 and V23 and closed the
switch between V21 and V22. The data report obtained from E2 feeder added up the
load consumption data from V22 but within an acceptable limit. The tampering was
detected in either V23 or V24.
Step 4: Repeat the switching procedure as previous steps. As illustrated in Fig. 6.7
(d), we opened the switch between V23 and V24 and closed the switch between V22 and
V23 in this step. As a result, the anomaly indicator installed in E2 responded an alarm
since the tampered load node V23 was connected to this feeder and the consumption
reading in E4 seemed normal. Therefore, we can decide that the tampering was in
the load node V23.
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6.4.3 Customer-Level Tampering Detection
After localizing the tampered load node, the profile-based anomaly detection using
consumption patterns comparison between the previous and the current period was
performed to find the tampered meter on customers’ level. There might be more than
one abnormal meters on this node.
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Chapter 7
Anomaly Node Searching
Incorporating Distributed
Generation
7.1 Introduction
There are two types of losses in power systems: technical and non-technical [155].
Technical losses are consisting mainly of inevitable power dissipation in power gener-
ation, transmission, and distribution while the non-technical losses consist of electric-
ity theft, non-payment energy usage, and errors in recording and billing. As the most
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egregious factor, the amount of energy theft is on the rise. Up to $6 billion of elec-
tricity is stolen in the U.S. annually [47, 114], while in developing countries, energy
theft can amount to 50% of the total energy delivered [46]. The traditional mechani-
cal meters can be compromised through physical tampering. Although the advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI) has improved system reliability and observability to
measure and control energy usage in communicating through metering devices, the
development of the AMI network brings with it security issues, including tamper-
ing metering data [129, 130] and the increasingly serious risk of malware in the new
emerging network.
The metering data can be tampered before being sent to the smart meters, inside
the smart meters, and over the communication links while the malware is usually
embedded in the data payloads of legitimate metering data. In time-critical commu-
nications, it is difficult to detect malware in metering devices, which are resource-
constrainted embedded systems. In 2009, Mike Davis at Blackhat demonstrated the
speed at which smart meters could be compromised by malware and how quickly
malware could propagate worms in the meters [156]. In 2010, the Stuxnet worm [42]
attacked SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems and PLCs
(Programmable Logic Controllers) in industrial systems [157, 158]. Different than
conventional malicious attacks, several smart meters might share a same identity
(ID) or one physical device may generate an arbitrary number of an additional ID,
which can launch Distributed Denial-of-service attack (DDoS) attacks. DDoS only
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affects the unavailability of smart meters. However, this attack can be utilized to
reduce the share of resources in the topology and give attackers more information to
perform other attacks [159, 160]. A McAfee report warned that an attacker could
exploit smart meters easily and takes control of the whole system [161]. Since the
system specifications, diverse network protocols, and operational-constrainted meter-
ing devices in AMI, the existing defense methods against malicious attacks cannot be
applied directly. The main motivation of this work is not to provide a defend method
to improve the cyber security of the grid network. It proposed a switching scheme to
detect and localize the occurred attacks or tampering behaviors within a distribution
system.
7.2 Related Works
Researchers to prevent abnormal electricity usages have done many existing methods.
Machine learning and data mining [139] have been widely applied for extensive intel-
ligent data analysis to recognize normal consumption patterns such that deviations
can be detected as anomalies. Authors in [137] using machine learning techniques on
the past data to built models for detecting anomalous meter readings. A technique
can identify diverse forms of tampered activities by using artificial neural networks
and smart meter fine-grained data in [162]. A state estimation algorithm utilizing the
Kalman filter to find measurement biases is proposed in [136] while a support vector
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machine (SVM) classifier was trained in [130, 138] using consumption reports from
areas with a high probability of energy theft. Another main strategy of detecting ma-
licious meters is based on the real-time comparison. In [135], the FRTU helps narrow
the search zone of energy fraud in smart home and community. Also, [129] compares
the real values with the predicted values and apply statistical measures to detect po-
tential tampered activities. The methods to distinguish malware-bearing traffic and
legitimate metering data using a disassembler and statistical analysis are described in
[163, 164]. Different than data based detection approaches, [165, 166] provide the at-
tack and intrusion detection mechanism for a smart grid neighborhood area network
(NAN). In addition, some strategies based on graph theory have been developed. In
[167], a novel inspection algorithm identifies each meter with a unique binary-coded
number to locate the unique malicious meter is proposed. The conversion between
the power grid and binary tree or spanning tree is adopted in [130, 168, 169]. Sensors
can also be employed to monitor and supervise meters in customers level, the distri-
bution grid, and the communication network. However, the sensor system presents
high deployment and maintenance costs, and false alarms may happen during the
detection process [133].
The reconfiguration switching scheme in the distribution system is mainly utilized
for fault localization, isolation, system restoration, and optimizing the performance
during those procedures. The main purpose to exploit this problem is to achieve
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optimization. In [141, 142], the authors deal with the problem existed in radial distri-
bution networks for minimum loss operations while [143, 144] proposed a strategy for
switching devices considers costs of customer outage, installation, as well as annual
operation and maintenance. In [145, 146, 147, 148] introduce methods with maximiz-
ing the restored load and minimizing the number of switching operations to achieve
distribution system restoration based on the graph theory.
7.3 Switching Strategies for Tampered Node Lo-
calization
In this section, the reconfiguration switching scheme and the profile-based tampering
detection are combined to localize the subfeeder, microgrid, cluster, or the distri-
bution node with tampered load(s) or malicious meter(s). Based on the economic
consideration, the non-technical losses should be larger than 5% of the normal power
consumption. All electrical utilities keep the power on during the switching proce-
dures while meeting electrical and operational constraints.
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7.3.1 Convert the Distribution Network To a Graph
A distribution grid is constructed by feeders and microgrids [170]. The feeders are
connected with each other through normally open tie switches. According to the
conversion process mentioned in Chapter 6, an example of a distribution network
with two substations and the corresponding adjacency and incidence matrices are
shown in Fig. 7.1. The sparsity visualization of the adjacency and incidence matrices
for the example topology are also illustrated in Fig. 7.1. It should be noted that the
order of vertices and edges may change the form of matrices but can not change the
topology of the graph. In this example, the order of vertices following the numbering
sequence in this figure while the S1 to S5 represent edges 2 to 7. The RTU1 and RTU2
represent edge 1 and 7, respectively. Two vertices V3 and V4 and their connection
S1 (edge 2) are displayed on the visualized sparse matrices. The nonzero elements of
these two matrices represent the number of edges in the graph. Since the graph is
undirected, each edge is counted twice. This example is used for the case study in
this paper.
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Figure 7.1: Sparsity visualization of the adjacency and incidence matrices
for the example topology.
7.3.2 Tampered Node Localization with Switching Strategies
The Algorithm 4 is the pseudocode that shows the more effective iterative procedure
how the node with tampered load(s) is localized for each iteration cooperated with
distributed generators. The following variables are defined as:
Mi Incidence matrix representing system topology. If vertex i is connected to edge
j, then Mi[i, j] = 1, otherwise, 0.
Ma Adjacent matrix representing system topology. If vertex i is adjacent to vertex
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j, then Ma[i, j] = 1, otherwise, 0.
Vr Row vector indicating the open/close of switches/breakers/reclosers with
length |E|. If switch i is open Vr[i] = 0, otherwise, 1.
Vs Row vector indicating the location of power sources with length |V |. If vertex
i connected with a power source, then Vs[i] = 1, otherwise, 0.
If Index of RTU/FRTU that indicates there exists tampered load(s).
Vg Row vector indicating the location of distributed generators with length |V |.
If vertex i connected with a distributed generators, then Vg[i] = 1, otherwise,
0.
The algorithm starts with balancing the benefits of detecting the tampered node, only
the detected power losses are more than 5%, the process is performed. The algorithm
is summarized as follows:
1. Isolate all subfeeders or clusters with distributed generators, if If shows no tam-
pered load(s), the tampered load(s) exists in the isolated subfeeders or clusters.
2. Restore the connection of each microgrid sequentially and check If to identify
which microgrid has the tampered load(s).
3. If the tampered load(s) is not in the isolated area, perform the iteration function
to localize the tampered node.
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Algorithm 4 Tampered Node Localization Algorithm
Input:
Mi, Vr, Vs, If
1: Isolate all subfeeders or clusters with distributed generators.
2: if If shows no tampered load(s) in this system.
then
3: Vf = Vg.
4: Restore the connection of each subfeeder or cluster sequentially and check If .
5: else
Iteration Fuction: Ff (Mi, Vr, Vs, If )
6: Vr(If ) = 0;
7: . Vr keeps updating;
8: . Convert the incidence matrix to the adjacency matrix with current connection
status;
9: Mi ←Mi · V Tr .
10: Ma ←Mi ·MTi .
11: Replace all diagonal elements of Ma with 0.
12: . Initialization;
13: Vf ← Vs.
14: V̂f ← Vf · 0.
15: . Criteria that if the state is same as the previous iteration.
16: while Vf − V̂f 6= 0 do
17: V̂f ← Vf .
18: Vf ← V̂f ·Ma + V̂f .
19: end while
20: Replace all nonzero elements in Vf with 1.
21: return Vf .
22: . Localize the tampered node.
23: Find all 0 elements in Vf .
24: while More than one tampered nodes in one feeder, change If to generate a
new Vr. do
25: Repeat Ff (Ma, Vr, Vs, If ).
26: end while
27: end if
4. Convert the incidence matrix to the adjacency matrix with current connection
status of switches for tampered nodes detection;
5. Initialize Vf with Vs and set V̂f as the previous iteration result of Vf and initialize
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V̂f with 0;
6. Check the status of every node during each iteration by checking Vf = V̂f ;
7. If status of all nodes are stable, replace all nonzero elements in Vf with 1;
8. For the situation that more than one tampered nodes in one feeder, change If
to generate a new Vr and repeat Ff (Mi, Vr, Vs, If );
9. Return Vf ;
10. Find 0 element(s) in Vf to localize the tampered node.
7.3.3 Customer-Level Fraud Detection
In this study, we assume all customers have smart meters. After localizing the tam-
pered load node, the profile-based tampering detection using consumption patterns
comparison between the previous and the current period was performed to find the
potential fraud on customers’ level. There might be more than one fraud on this
node.
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7.4 A Case Study
This section is to validate the proposed graph-theoretic strategy for tempering detec-
tion using reconfiguration switching schemes with a topology of a distribution system.
The procedures of changing connection status of switches to reconfigure the topology
keeps the whole system power on and meet the electrical and operational constraints.
7.4.1 Test Case Description
Fig. 7.2 is the topology of the distribution test network. There are two substations
and six load nodes. The two switches at each feeder head are deployed with a sub-
station RTU to perform the profile-based tampering detection. The two load nodes
with the distributed generators can generate the microgrids [171, 172]. The randomly
generated tampered loads are detected by RTU2.
The corresponding input incidence matrix can be gathered from the previous section.
The input row vectors of the first scenario in Fig. 7.2 are as Vs = [1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1]
since V1 and V2 are two power sources; Vr = [1 1 1 0 1 1 1] due to the normally
open tie switch S3; If = 7 for the random fraud alarm and Vg = 7 because of the
distributed generator. In the second scenario, the Vs, If , and Vg remain unchanged
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Figure 7.2: Switching procedures to localize the tampered load node in the
example topology.
while Vr = [1 1 1 1 0 0 1] since the switching procedure.
7.4.1.1 Switching Procedures
Since the topology of the test system keeps unchanged, the input incidence matrix has
no changes. The difference between each iteration is the updated connecting status
Vr.
Step 1: Under the operational constraints, connect the tie switch between these two
feeders in order to keep the test system power on during this procedure.
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Step 2: Isolate the load node V6 since it connected with a distributed generator
which can supply the power for this microgrid.
Step 3: Perform the profile-based tampering detection at RTU2, if RTU2 shows
normally, the tampered loads are not in V7.
Step 4: Perform the profile-based tampering detection at RTU1, if RTU1 shows
normally, the tampered loads are in V6; If not, the tampered loads are in V5.
In this work, a simple virtual distribution network is applied, since the main content
of this work is in the strategy of switching the openable edges, the search process
could be an exponential time search or only spend a linear time in a real distribution
network. This is the preliminary work that intend to prove the feasibility of the
proposed idea.
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Chapter 8
Inference of Massive Tampering
8.1 Introduction
The discrepancy between actual usage and metering information occurs due to illegal
or irregular electricity consumers, tampering of meters or records, and unmetered
supplies [24, 25]. Among those, large amounts of these losses are absorbed by fraudu-
lent electricity consumers. Up to $6 billion of electricity is stolen in the U.S. annually,
while in developing countries, energy theft can amount to 50% of the total energy
delivered [46, 114, 155, 173]. Traditional physical tampering includes directly using
alternative neutral lines to connect unregistered electrical appliances, sabotaging con-
trol wires and feeders, using magnets to decelerate the spinning discs for recording
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the energy consumption, and tapping off of a neighbor/legal consumer [24, 155, 174].
In order to improve the system reliability and observability to measure and control
energy usage in communicating through IP-based metering devices, utilities around
the world have been refining their business models to provide additional choices to
consumers by deploying advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). However, the de-
velopment of the AMI network also brings with it security issues, including tampering
metering data [129, 130, 175, 176, 177] and the increasingly serious risk of malware
in the new emerging network [178]. It is apparent that knowing how to identify cases
of anomalous discrepancy accurately is vital for utilities. Such identification provides
a means of devising and implementing suitable preventative and corrective means of
reducing the losses involved [174].
Cybertampering is an electronic alteration from their real consumption values in me-
tering devices through the cyber attack. The most common situation is the malicious
customers may reduce the scale of their energy usages to fake their electricity bills
[177, 179]. The massive tampering in a distribution system can utilize vulnerabilities
in multiple connections, which include exploitation on existing communication media
and protocols, segregation of network architectures, and false data injection, to attack
multiple metering devices (usually more than 20%) simultaneously. Malware usually
runs in a system through the concealed installation and embedded in the data pay-
loads of legitimate metering data. When the invasion of a single meter is completed,
the worm or virus quickly infects nearby meters and can even invade the main server
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and host [180, 181, 182], causing massive tampering. The infected devices with mal-
ware can be manipulated to perform unauthorized use of services covertly [183]. In
2009, Mike Davis at Blackhat demonstrated the speed at which SMs could be com-
promised by malware and how quickly malware could propagate worms in the meters
[156]. In 2010, the Stuxnet worm [42] attacked SCADA systems and programmable
logic controllers (PLCs) in industrial systems [157, 158]. In 2015, due to the attack of
the malware named BlackEnergy, the Ukrainian power grid suffered a sudden power
outage, causing more than 700,000 households in western Ukraine under power out-
ages for several hours [184]. Although the distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack
only affects the unavailability of SMs, this attack can be utilized to reduce the share
of resources in the topology and give attackers more information to perform other
attacks [159, 160]. A McAfee report warned that an attacker could exploit SMs easily
and takes control of the whole system [161].
Malware detectors and anti-virus software should be installed in the alarm system
of metering devices to prevent intrusion and/or track the footprint of malware [185].
The alarm system of the modern power grid mainly includes anomaly detection of the
information network and the operation monitoring of the physical system combining
with the abnormal data injection. The intrusion detection system is used in the
information network to monitor the communication traffic in the smart grid. When
an attack occurs, the intrusion detection system analyzes traffic based on specific rules
and generates an alert with an IP/MAC address [186]. In a physical system, data
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is mainly the power parameters such as voltage/current amplitude, voltage/current
phase, etc. These measurements can be used to estimate the state of the system and
send an alarm to the operator if the state is abnormal [74]. Since the communication
topology and the physical topology in the smart grid are interrelated as shown in Fig.
8.1, the IP/MAC address and suspicious nodes/lines in the physical system can be
used to correlate their respective security factors or trustworthy parameters and be
used for system analysis. Also, these parameters can combine with the statistic of
anomaly occurs in metering devices, communication networks, and servers/hosts of
the system to establish the malware detection model [187, 188] in the alarm system.
Therefore, a complete and reliable alarm system can monitor the network and the
physical layers at the same time, which can help the control center to get better
countermeasures for different types of intrusions.
The main motivation of this work is not to provide a defend or maintain strategy
to improve the cybersecurity of the grid network, it proposed a scheme to detect
ongoing malware attacks or tampering behaviors within a distribution subsystem.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a massive tampering inference
method associated with a probabilistic trust model. The trustworthy computing is
based on the statistics of alarms and event logs from the metering system.
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Figure 8.1: An example of an electrical distribution system with massive
tampering in subsystems via malware.
8.2 Model Formulation for Massive Tampering In-
ference
Fig. 8.1 demonstrates an example of an electrical distribution system with massive
tampering in subsystems via malware. The power injection starting from the feeder
head of a primary distribution feeder to end consumers. With the presence of FRTUs,
the distribution feeder can be grouped into several subsystems, e.g., subsystems are
partitioned by light gray areas. The home area network (HAN) provides interfaces
into the home and business (end-node) for energy consumption monitoring and to
support demand response functionality [189]. The HAN ensures the communication
from the meter to devices inside the consumers home and allows devices located
within a home to communicate with each other. The neighborhood area network
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(NAN) provides communication between devices or meters in a small area, typically
extending the reach to the majority of the meter population [189]. The data exchange
might occur between HANs and NANs but not with the wide area network (WAN).
It provides communications from the utility head end out to devices in the field.
Field access or collection points on the edge of the WAN provide connections to
and/or consolidation of meter data collected by the NAN for retrieval [177, 189].
The WAN is also used to communicate with all or specific devices in the field to
initiate tasks, upgrade firmware or request specific data. The worm propagation and
malware injection often occur in the HAN/NAN level [165, 166]. Once malware gains
installation permissions via the physical and/or electronic layer, it is highly likely to
cause a large number of vulnerabilities which will lead to massive tampering. Anomaly
detectors and the alarm system may be set up in NAN and the control system [175].
Attackers gain access 
and install malware.
Massive tampering.
Decrypt configure file.
Exploit other 
servers or host.
Distribution 
and Infection
Fix vulnerabilities.
Send alarm to 
operators.
Archive event logs.
Detected 
Figure 8.2: Generation of alarm and event log according to the malware
detection.
The process of malware attack is illustrated in Fig. 8.2. Attackers gain access through
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malicious code (electronic layer) or other artificial means (physical layer) and install
malicious software to a server. Malicious code quickly decrypts the configuration file
of the target operating platform and creates a large number of vulnerabilities. The
malware then spreads viruses or worms to nearby or higher-level servers or meters,
causing massive tampering. Once the malware is detected, the corresponding vul-
nerabilities are fixed and the system sends an alert to the console and generates an
event log for future reference. The proposed approach according to the statistics of
alarms (not just malware alarm) to generate a probabilistic trust model to evaluate
the possible discrepancy.
Ideally, as subsystems illustrated in Fig. 8.1, the measurements from the zonal
SCADA system should be equal to the summation of all home SMs’ readings with
an acceptable power loss. The root FRTU serves as a power injection point of the
subsystem, the FRTU(s) located at the points downstream subtrees are treated as
the border switches, which are the leaf nodes of a spanning tree. Real-time power
flow measurements of these FRTUs represent lumped loads of the other subsystems
connected to them. Power losses for the given subsystem can be estimated by apply-
ing any distribution power flow method. Due to some reported device failure or data
losses (based on alarms), there is an extra energy loss ∆Et,i. The alarm-based trust
model is applied for each FRTU and SM to estimate the detected anomalous energy
losses. Once ∆Et,i exceeds the detected variation from alarm reports as described in
(8.1), the undetected massive tampering might exist in the subsystem, an anomalous
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state is triggered.
∆Et,i = | (PFRTU,i · x · tp −
∑
j∈Ji
αt,j · PFRTU,j · x · tp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
measurement from
primary network,
i.e.SCADA
−
∑
l∈Li
βt,l · P SM,l · ts︸ ︷︷ ︸
measurement from
secondary network,
i.e.smart meters
−P loss,i · ts|,
αt,j, βt,l ∈ [0, 1], tp = ts
x
.
(8.1)
∆Et,i detected anomalous energy losses in i-th subsystem during time period t.
PFRTU,i
measurement of power consumption by the root FRTU in the i-th subsystem.
PFRTU,j
power measurement by the j-th FRTU, which is one of the leaf FRTUs (nodes)
in the i-th subsystem.
PSM,l power measurement of l-th home SM in i-th subsystem.
P tloss,i technical power losses of the i-th subsystem, which can be estimated by ap-
plying any distribution power flow analysis.
ts time cycle of gathering metering measurements from SMs, it is usually set as
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15-min.
Ji set of FRTUs leaf nodes in the i-th subsystem.
Li set of home SMs belonging to the i-th subsystem.
αt,j trust model based on alarm statistics for the measurement from the primary
network in the j-th device in t.
βt,l trust model based on alarm statistics for the measurement from the secondary
network in the l-th meter in t.
tp time cycle of gathering measurements from FRTU, it is usually set as 1 to 3
seconds.
x normalization parameter.
A compromised cybersecurity of a SCADA system can cause serious damage to a
power system if the attack is able to launch disruptive switching actions leading to a
loss of load or equipment damage. This is particularly troublesome if the attack can
penetrate the control center network that is connected to distribution substations
under the SCADA system [190]. The impact analysis is the task to analyze the
intrusion behaviors and the potential threatens, evaluate the resultant consequences
of the cyber attacks, and consider the economic balance. The operator should balance
the detection cost versus the tampered power loss. Another threshold to decide
whether or not to execute the following switching procedure to localize the tampered
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area could be considered. In (8.2), Pxt is the real-time price (dynamic by time) and
∆Ci,t is the estimated economic loss during t in i-th subsystem.
∆Ci,t = |Pxt ·∆Et,i|. (8.2)
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Figure 8.3: Binary representation of alarms and availability of FRTU and
SM in time duration t.
8.3 Probabilistic Trust Model
Fig. 8.3 demonstrates an example of the binary representation of alarms and “heart-
beat” of FRTU and SM in time duration t. Considering the availability and alarm
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Table 8.1
Statistics of alarms for FRTU and SM in duration t.
FRTU
Alarm Types Threaten Levels # of Times Occurrence Prob.
Recloser Tripped 3 9 0.15
High Humidity 2 6 0.12
Insufficient Disk 1 1 0.01
Inverter Fault 2 7 0.14
High Temperature 2 9 0.20
High Frequency 2 3 0.06
Motor Tripped 3 5 0.10
Door Open 1 3 0.05
Fault Detected 3 8 0.15
Wrong Login Password 1 6 0.2
Low Battery 1 1 0.01
Device Oﬄine 3 3 0.05
Smart Meter
Wrong Login Password 1 7 0.15
Low Power Quality 2 8 0.15
Meter Malfunction 3 1 0.01
Tamper Attempts 3 8 0.15
High Temperature 2 7 0.13
High Usage 1 9 0.15
Power Outage 2 6 0.05
Upgrade Fail 3 2 0.15
Connection Break 3 2 0.02
Meter Reboot 2 4 0.03
Voltage Imbalance 2 7 0.05
Low Battery 1 4 0.01
results of a device as a binary event, we assume 0 represents “alive” or no alarms
and 1 represents “dead” or alarm occurs. In this example, there are multiple types of
alarms and t includes 50 ∆ts, which is the observation time units. Table 8.1 illustrates
the corresponding statistical results of alarms for FRTU and SM as shown in Fig. 8.3.
It should be noted that, in FRTU, the measurement will be recorded every 1 to 3
seconds while the recording is usually counted every 15-min in SMs, therefore, a time
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normalization should be performed first to extend the recording time as 15-min either
in the FRTU and then do the statistics for the whole observation time window. As
mentioned before, alarms, which include the cyberattack and malware information,
are the core factor to estimate the reliability of a device, the device trust model can
be established according to alarm feedbacks. The mathematical model used to handle
the dynamics of trust is based on probabilities transition. According to the statistic
results of alarms in the archived records, the probability that an alarm occurs during
a time duration t can be estimated as (8.3):
pA = 1−
∏
(1− qm), m = 1, 2, 3, · · · . (8.3)
where qm represents the occurrence probability of type m alarm, which can be esti-
mated from the statistics and observations of archived data. According to the values
in the last column in Table 8.1, the pA for the FRTU can be calculated as 0.738 and
0.618 for the SM.
Since there are multiple alarm properties with different priorities/severities in t,
alarms are divided into 3 levels with different probabilities that may affect the device:
1) Level 1, almost no effect on normal operation, such as the wrong login password,
the probability that the Level 1 alarm will affect the availability of the device is set
as δL1 = 0.01; 2) Level 2, may affect the normal operation, such as high temperature,
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the probability that these alarms will affect the availability of the device is set as
δL2 = 0.5; and 3) Level 3, highly possible affect the normal operation, such as fault
detected and the device unavailable probability is set as δL3 = 0.95. Therefore, the
number of alarms in t, NA,t = NA,t,L1 +NA,t,L2 +NA,t,L3 , where NA,t is the number of
alarms occurred in t and NA,t,Lk represents the number of alarms in level k. Then,
the unavailable probability of the device in t according to different threaten levels’
alarms can be represented by the conditional probability expression as (8.4):
pU,t =
k∑
pt(U|Lk) · pt(Lk)
=
k∑
δt,Lk ·
NA,t,Lk
NA,t
, k = 1, 2, 3.
(8.4)
In this example, the pU,t for the FRTU can be estimated as 0.596 and the value for
the SM is 0.439. According to (8.3) and (8.4), the probabilistic trust model based on
alarm responses in duration t can be represented as (8.5):
τt = 1− PA,t · PU,t, (8.5)
the trust model τt for j-th FRTU in t is represented as αt,j and the alarm based trust
model for l-th SM in t is βt,l in (8.1). The minimum observation time window for both
FRTU and the SM is one week. In order to estimate the anomalous energy losses
∆Et,i in (8.1), the recording time unit for the FRTU and SM should be normalized
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first. In the example, αt = 0.560 and βt = 0.729 for 50 weeks.
Following the increasing number of alarms in a device, the trust gradually decreases,
on the contrary, if the number of alarms decreases in the next observation time win-
dow, the trust will gradually increase. Therefore, the accumulated probabilistic trust
model should be affected by the trust value from the previous estimation duration
and can be defined as (8.6):
τa =

τt · τt−1, if NA,t ≥ NA,t−1,
1− (1− τt) · (1− τt−1), if NA,t < NA,t−1,
t = 1, 2, 3 · · ·n.
(8.6)
The trust value of each FRTU and the SM should be regularly adjusted to reflect
changes in the timely recording results. According to alarms statistics, the trust
value from αt,j and βt,l can be used to define four different cases.
† Case 1: There are no alarms from the primary network in a duration t, trust
the measurement from the primary network but suspect the measurement from
the secondary network, αt,j = 1, the βt,l is the decision variable;
† Case 2: There are no alarms from the secondary network in a duration t,
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suspect the measurement from the primary network but trust the measurement
from the secondary network, βt,l = 1, the αt,j is the decision variable;
† Case 3: If alarms received from both the primary and secondary network,
suspect the measurements from the primary and the secondary network, both
the αt,j and βt,l are decision variables;
† Case 4: If the SCADA and AMI systems are unavailable, e.g. losing commu-
nication, system damaged, and/or unauthorized configuration change, αt,j =
0, βt,l = 0, the subsystem can infer the consumption information from the allo-
cation factor (AF) schemes.
Since Case 4 is a rare case and the system security logs and alerts can detect this
anomaly, Cases 1 to 3 would be of interest to the massive tampering analysis and
thus are the major concern of the proposed framework.
8.4 Case Study
As shown in Fig. 8.4 (a) is the tree representation of a 7-node topology. Two FRTUs
are equipped ahead of nodes 2 and 7 in the primary network, three home SMs in
the secondary network are connected on the lateral between these two FRTUs. The
power injection direction is from the root node (node 1) to other downstream nodes.
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Figure 8.4: Spanning tree for a 7-node example topology with schematic
diagrams for three cases.
The corresponding communication networks are also indicated in this representation.
The following assumptions are made to facilitate the inference of massive tampering
in this case:
1. All customers in the test subsystem are equipped with IP-based energy meters
(smart meters);
2. The root FRTU/RTU is installed with complete security strategies to protect
it from any cyberattack or malware tampering;
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3. Detectable anomalies are from on-going attacks;
4. Most of the existing FRTUs and SMs use different communication networks,
i.e., SCADA network versus AMI network, separated by frame relay switches,
and different communication protocols (e.g., DNP3 versus ANSI C12.18). There
is no direct communication link between the FRTUs and SMs;
5. There is no switching and system reconfiguration in the network while perform-
ing anomaly inference. Thus, network topology and parameters of both primary
and secondary distribution networks are accurate in real time;
6. According to the statistic and observation results, the alarm occurrence proba-
bility qm in Level 1 is 0.1, in Level 2 is 0.05, and 0.01 for Level 3;
7. The probability that the Level 1 alarm will affect the availability of the device
is less or equal to 0.01, the probability for Level 2 alarm is around 0.5, and the
Level 3 alarm has 95% possible to affect the device.
8.4.1 Case 1
An assumption, in this case, is the whole SCADA system has been developed with
security strategies to protect it from the cyber attacks or any other threatens (αj = 1),
while the validation for home SMs remains in the early stage. As shown in Fig. 8.4
(b), massive alarms occurred in HAN and/or NAN due to multiple types of attacks
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or threatens that caused the ∆Et,i. Assume the unit observation time window is
one month and the study duration is one season. The randomly generated array
of alarms follows the Poisson distribution. The number of the different alarms (12
types) in the four observation time windows for SMs 3, 5, and 6 are illustrated in
Fig. 8.5, separately. The curve figure demonstrates the monthly trust value for each
observation window from (8.5) and the accumulated value according to (8.6) of these
three SMs. In the estimation of accumulated trust value, the start point is assumed
as the trust value generated from the first time window. The monthly trust values in
each time window and the estimated accumulated trustworthy adjustment of case 1
are shown in Table 8.2.
8.4.2 Case 2
The security levels of SCADA and AMI system, in this case, are completely opposite
than Case 1: the metering information from home SMs is validated because of the
trustable communications in NAN/HAN (βt,l = 1), but the WAN might experience
attacks either from the physical or electronic layers as shown in Fig. 8.4 (c). The
downstream FRTU (FRTU2) received multiple alarms. The alarms types are different
than that in SMs but also following the binary pattern. Fig. 8.6 demonstrates the
statistic result of received alarms associated with the probabilistic trust evaluations
in the j-th FRTU. The trustworthy adjustment of the affected FRTU is shown in
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Figure 8.5: Statistic of alarms associated with the adjustment of trustwor-
thy for each SM.
Table 8.2.
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8.4.3 Case 3
An undifferentiated cyberattack occurred in this subsystem, both the SCADA and the
AMI networks are penetrated. As shown in Fig. 8.4 (d), the measurements from the
downstream FRTU and SMs are all not trustable. Utilize the assumptions in Cases
1 and 2 to estimate the adjustments of trustworthy for each SM and the downstream
FRTU. The randomly generated alarms also following the Poisson distribution and
the trust variations in the observation time window for each SM and the downstream
FRTU are illustrated in Fig. 8.7 and the numerical trust values of this case are
recorded in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2 recorded the monthly and accumulated trust summaries for three cases.
It can be seen that the trust value varies completely according to the number and
the severity of alarms in the device (the heartbeat of the device) during a specific
observation time period.
In the pre-defined data structure to perform the power flow analysis based on the
example topology, the loads in the secondary network are defined as three-phase
unbalanced with a wye connection type. The phase conductor of the overhead line
in this example subsystem is selected as the 336,400 26/7 ACSR while the neutral
conductor is the 4/0 6/1 ACSR. After defining the distance of each edge and the
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Table 8.2
Monthly and accumulated trust summaries for three cases.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
SM3 SM5 SM6 FRTU2 SM3 SM5 SM6 FRTU2
Monthly
0.824 0.735 0.783 0.720 0.741 0.741 0.781 0.782
0.741 0.826 0.831 0.796 0.767 0.707 0.739 0.737
0.844 0.755 0.822 0.739 0.783 0.748 0.681 0.795
0.817 0.740 0.808 0.761 0.730 0.731 0.768 0.761
Accumulated
0.824 0.735 0.78 0.720 0.741 0.741 0.781 0.782
0.955 0.607 0.963 0.574 0.940 0.524 0.577 0.943
0.625 0.957 0.683 0.589 0.949 0.529 0.917 0.586
0.971 0.559 0.966 0.562 0.572 0.933 0.926 0.605
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source voltage, a graph-based power flow can calculate the voltages and currents of
all nodes. Under the same conditions, input the topology and relative properties into
another simulator (GridLAB-D) to generate the energy consumptions approximate
to the real environment as the measurements. In the ideal case, no cyber attack
occurred in this subsystem (αj = 1, βl = 1), the estimated energy measurements
and the average consumption from power flow results for each metering points in one
month are demonstrated in row 1 of Table 8.3. The light yellow columns show the
normal technical losses in power distribution.
188
Table 8.3
Estimated power measurements for each FRTU and EM in the case
subsystem.
Actual
Value
Measured Power Flow
SCADA AMI
Loss
SCADA AMI
Loss %
FRTU1 FRTU2 SM3 SM5 SM6 FRTU1 FRTU2 SM3 SM5 SM6
989.79 208.47 261.72 269.83 247.54 2.23 985.06 217.79 254.62 270.12 239.46 3.0604 0.31%
987.94 231.91 244.29 268.53 241.33 1.88 994.12 241.20 240.14 270.24 239.56 2.9790 0.30%
985.67 233.66 242.10 268.21 237.97 3.73 986.39 232.85 240.77 270.15 239.49 3.1331 0.32%
986.13 229.45 243.35 267.99 242.75 2.59 979.67 220.63 246.73 270.08 239.43 2.7963 0.29%
Case 1
Sensitivity Adjusted Measurements
SCADA AMI
Subsystem
SCADA AMI
Var. %
FRTU1 FRTU2 SM3 SM5 SM6 FRTU1 FRTU2 SM3 SM5 SM6
100% 100% 82.4% 73.5% 78.3% 47.42% 989.79 208.47 215.66 198.33 193.82 171.28 17.30%
100% 100% 74.1% 82.6% 83.1% 50.86% 987.94 231.91 181.02 221.81 200.55 150.77 15.26%
100% 100% 84.4% 75.5% 82.2% 52.38% 985.67 233.66 204.33 202.50 195.61 145.84 14.80%
100% 100% 81.7% 74.0% 80.8% 48.85% 986.13 229.45 198.82 198.31 196.14 160.82 16.31%
Case 2
Sensitivity Adjusted Measurements
SCADA AMI
Subsystem
SCADA AMI
Var. %
FRTU1 FRTU2 SM3 SM5 SM6 FRTU1 FRTU2 SM3 SM5 SM6
100% 72.0% 100% 100% 100% 72.0% 989.79 150.10 261.72 269.83 247.54 58.37 5.90%
100% 79.6% 100% 100% 100% 79.6% 987.94 184.60 244.29 268.53 241.33 47.31 4.79%
100% 73.9% 100% 100% 100% 73.9% 985.67 172.67 242.10 268.21 237.97 60.99 6.19%
100% 76.1% 100% 100% 100% 76.1% 986.13 174.61 243.35 267.99 242.75 54.84 5.56%
Case 3
Sensitivity Adjusted Measurements
SCADA AMI
Subsystem
SCADA AMI
Var. %
FRTU1 FRTU2 SM3 SM5 SM6 FRTU1 FRTU2 SM3 SM5 SM6
100% 74.1% 74.1% 78.1% 78.2% 33.53% 989.79 163.02 193.93 199.94 193.33 237.34 23.98%
100% 76.7% 70.7% 73.9% 73.7% 29.53% 987.94 170.92 187.37 189.85 178.34 259.58 26.27%
100% 78.3% 74.8% 68.1% 79.5% 31.71% 985.67 185.76 189.56 200.62 162.06 243.94 24.75%
100% 73.0% 73.1% 76.8% 76.1% 31.19% 986.13 174.61 177.65 195.90 186.43 248.95 25.25%
? Unit of measurements is kWh; Var. represents variation.
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Rows 2 to 4 demonstrate the sensitivities and adjusted measurements for three cases.
The trust percentages illustrated with green columns in sensitivity part of each case
are from Table 8.2. The calculated adjusted measurements are combining the trust
values and the measured information from row 1. The trustworthy parameter of the
subsystem is following (8.7)
1−
∏
(1− τj), (8.7)
where τj is the trust value of the j-th device in the subsystem. In Case 1, the varied
trust values of these three SMs lead to adjusted values in energy consumptions. The
total energy variation of the subsystem excludes the normal energy loss from the
measurements. In Case 2, the possible energy consumption in the downstream FRTU
is changed and both the SCADA and the AMI system are not trustable in Case 3.
The actual measurement variations must less than the calculated variations. On the
contrary, once the variation in a subsystem exceeds the potential variation value,
there must exist massive tampering (more than 20% variation).
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
One of the critical milestones on smart grid vision is to deploy sensing devices within
an electrical network. As evident by today’s mobile phone technologies, the traffic
information can be inferred from the movement of mobile users to determine their
whereabouts. The proposed agent-based framework in Chapter 2 represents the ob-
servable dynamics of consumers’ energy consumption and movements which are used
to correlate the patterns of two interdependencies. The adaptive parameterization of
occupancy-consumption aggregation has demonstrated the feasibility of the proposed
correlation framework. The finite mixtures of regression models are adjusted by cor-
relating with data available from AMI, on-site meter reading, SCADA measurements
or historical datasets.
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The smart meter deployment was aimed to deploy on every household. The increased
metering points within a distribution network can improve observability. However,
it would involve an initial investment and ongoing maintenance costs. The hetero-
geneous framework can be utilized to enhance load models and observability that
incorporate the dynamics of occupants’ movements and how the existence patterns
may influence the energy consumptions. As each load may have unique patterns that
can be inferred from their activities, the proposed OP pairs can set as a statisti-
cal reference for inferring consumption usages. The load profile enrichment can be
established through the infusion of historical energy consumption datasets.
The proposed heterogeneous framework can be implemented in multiple ways. One
way is to enable a data exchange path between the communication providers and
utilities. The other alternative is to promote mobile app by utilities that would
engage and incentivize their customers. Some utilities may have metering data from
their distribution SCADA system. There are several metering points within a feeder
that would provide the data acquisition. Utilities might have to invest additional
network infrastructure and security measures to ensure the confidentiality of real-time
occupant datasets. Privacy is important and this issue can be mitigated. The identity
of occupants at the certain location will be masked at the level of service providers
that do not include anything but their physical location at the time. To strengthen
the privacy of household consumers, the utility company can strictly enforce a non-
disclosure agreement with employees.
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The correlation framework can be utilized to estimate an unmetered load from other
similar profiles. Such inference provides a means to establish new load profiles that
can create a new application in the distribution control center. This can eliminate on-
site data collection visits as a result of labor savings. This preliminary work also offers
to improve system observability with other interdependent networks. The extension
of other load types, such as industrial or commercial, can be enhanced by relating
with thousands of metered and unmetered loads within a feeder.
In Chapter 3, it proposed an anomaly detection and localization technique using
switching procedures based on the graph theory. The profile-based anomaly detection
method is utilized to compare the consumption value displayed on the branch head
with the summation of all meters readings in its downstream. After localizing the
abnormal load node, the comparison of consumption pattern for all meters connected
with this node will be performed to find the tampered meter.
In the process of localizing the abnormal load node, the distribution network is con-
verted to a spanning tree to demonstrate the connection states in the topology and to
avoid generating loops during switching procedures, and then convert the spanning
tree to incidence or adjacency matrix for future analysis. An anomaly localization
algorithm is introduced to find the tampered load node. In addition, the cost consid-
eration is mentioned to balance the benefit of localizing the tampered meter. In this
work, a virtual distribution network is applied in the case study, a real distribution
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network will be used to validate the algorithm in the future. Since the main content
of this work is in the strategy of switching the openable edges while meeting electrical
and operational constraints, the search process could be an exponential time search
or only spend a linear time. The corresponding combination strategy and search
method will be illustrated in a future analysis. Some simulation software such as
the geographic information system (GIS) can be utilized to construct the real topol-
ogy. Another vector to store the open switch information instead of changing the
input incidence matrix during each iteration will be added. An agent-based model to
generate random tampered nodes and random anomaly frequencies in the provided
network will be conducted. This model can also generate the consumption dataset
for estimating the effect of anomalies in the topology and calculating the cost due
to the fraudulent activities. The anomaly localization algorithm will be improved to
adapt the situations that more than one tampering exists in the same feeder or in
the whole network. Furthermore, a heuristic algorithm developed to replace the DFS
method in the original work to improve the search efficiency in a spanning tree.
Massive tampering of electrical metering is a notorious problem in the electric power
system, which causes great economic losses and threatens the reliability of the power
system. In smart grids, smart meters and even the FRTU/RTU with a higher-level
security level may potentially be attacked or tampered to cause certain anomalous
losses. It is challenging to identify large-scale malicious meters when there are a large
number of users. Finding efficient measurements for detecting falsified consumption
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datasets and identifying the tampered load(s) have been active researchers in recent
years. Statistical studies have shown that malware is one of the main reasons leading
to massive tampering and even threatening the entire system.
In addition to providing real-time data logging, modern grid metering equipment can
provide anomalous feedback. The SCADA system in the primary network realizes
data transmission through the WAN network, while the AMI system in the secondary
network communicates through HAN and NAN. The two are independent networks,
and any system or measurement device in the power grid encounters network attacks
or any threat from other physical or electronic layers. It will send alarms to the
control center and archive the relevant event logs. This paper creates a probabilistic
trust model to adjust and estimate the deviation of measured values in the system or
a subsystem within an observation time window by extracting the statistics of alarms
and related event logs. Thus realizing the inference of whether there is massive
tampering. At this stage, only one inference result is proposed in this paper. It does
not propose prevention, defense, and/or modification measures. In the future study,
through the reconfiguration of the system physical or network topology, combining
with the trust model and adjusted measurements at each node, the tampered lumped
load could be localized. Furthermore, the corresponding maintenance and defense
strategies should be provided.
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